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BAY AREA RAPID TRANSIT ACTIONS OF 
AUGUST 11, 2011: HOW EMERGING DIGITAL 
TECHNOLOGIES INTERSECT WITH FIRST 
AMENDMENT RIGHTS 
Erika J. Pitzel* 
INTRODUCTION 
Recently, people have used digital technologies to organize actions 
aimed at their governments, and governments have countered by 
using technology to address these popular movements. The Chinese 
government has blocked access to social media1 and the use of other 
personal communication devices to stop protest movements.2 When 
                                                                                                                                      
 *  J.D. Candidate, 2013, Georgia State University College of Law. Thank you to the Law Review 
editors for their valuable insight and suggestions. 
 1. Social media is defined as “forms of electronic communication (as Web sites for social 
networking and microblogging) through which users create online communities to share information, 
ideas, personal messages, and other content (as videos).” Social Media Definition, MERRIAM-WEBSTER 
ONLINE DICTIONARY, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/social%20media (last visited Mar. 
15, 2013). Some examples of social media include: blogs; social networking sites, such as Facebook and 
Twitter; photo and video sharing platforms; and communication via text messages. Samantha Murphy, 
Social Media: Huge, and Here to Stay, TECHNEWSDAILY (July 27, 2010, 11:59 AM), 
http://www.technewsdaily.com/834-social-media-huge-and-here-to-stay.html. Social media can be 
accessed through a computer or with mobile communication devices, including smartphones. Antone 
Gonsalves, Social Network Use by Smartphones Jumps, INFORMATIONWEEK (Mar. 4, 2010, 10:19 AM), 
http://www.informationweek.com/hardware/handheld/social-network-use-by-smartphones-
jumps/223101506. A smartphone is “a cell phone that includes additional software functions (as e-mail 
or an Internet browser).” Smartphone Definition, MERRIAM-WEBSTER ONLINE DICTIONARY, 
http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/smart%20phone (last visited Mar. 15, 2013). 
 2. In May 2011, the Chinese government shut down social media sites in response to protests by 
students and citizens of Inner Mongolia. See Steven Jiang, Activists: Inner Mongolia Protests Continue, 
CNN (May 31, 2011), http://articles.cnn.com/2011-05-31/world/china.mongolia.protest_1_martial-law-
protest-turnout-protests-spread?_s=PM:WORLD. In response to riots in Xinjiang in July 2009, Chinese 
authorities disabled social networks, blocked Twitter and cell phone service, and censored the internet in 
an effort to stop further demonstrations. See Michael Wines, In Latest Upheaval, China Applies New 
Strategies to Control Flow of Information, N.Y. TIMES (July 7, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07 
/08/world/asia/08beijing.html?scp=3&sq=Uighurs%20china%20social%20media%20shut%20down&st
=cse. In 2009, the Chinese government shut down Twitter, Flickr, Hotmail, and Live.com in anticipation 
of the anniversary of Tiananmen Square protests. See Michael Wines & Andrew Jacobs, To Shut Off 
Tiananmen Talk, China Disrupts Sites, N.Y. TIMES (June 2, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/03 
/world/asia/03china.html. 
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Iranian protestors used Twitter3 and other social media to mobilize 
and plan rallies protesting the results of the Iranian national 
presidential election in 2009, Iran’s government responded by 
blocking cell phone service, disrupting internet satellite service, and 
filtering websites.4 In February 2011, protestors in Iran, Bahrain, and 
Yemen also used social media to arrange “solidarity demonstrations,” 
and again, governments responded by blocking these sites.5 In 2011, 
Egypt and Syria also blocked access to cell phones and other 
communication technologies to disrupt protests.6 In August 2011, 
even Great Britain contemplated restricting social media to disrupt 
rioting that was coordinated using these emerging communication 
methods.7 
                                                                                                                                      
 3. “Twitter is a real-time information network” that can be used to “quickly share information with 
people,” and can be used by anyone who has a mobile phone. About, TWITTER, http://twitter.com/about 
(last visited Feb. 3, 2013). 
 4. The Iranian government cut cell phone and mobile text messaging services and filtered internet 
and social media sites, such as Twitter and Facebook. David Folkenflik, Social Media Allows Reports 
Despite Tehran’s Curbs, NPR (June 16, 2009), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=1 
05490051. During this 2009 event, Twitter was one of the major social media sites used by protesters to 
communicate plans for additional demonstrations. See id.; Twitter Emerges as News Source During Iran 
Media Crackdown, CBC NEWS (June 16, 2009, 1:02 PM), http://www.cbc.ca/news/technology/story/20 
09/06/15/iran-twitter-election-protest.html. 
 5. Martha Raddatz, Social Media Fuels Protests in Iran, Bahrain and Yemen, ABC NEWS (Feb. 15, 
2011), http://abcnews.go.com/International/social-media-fuels-protests-iran-bahrain-yemen/story?id=12 
926081 (describing how protestors used cell phones, smartphones, and Facebook to encourage 
participation in the demonstrations). 
 6. In January 2011, the Egyptian government instituted an almost complete shutdown of internet 
and cell phone service. Matt Richtel, Egypt Cuts Off Most Internet and Cell Service, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 
28, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/29/technology/internet/29cutoff.html. Protestors had used 
these methods of communication “to organize and to spread their message.” Id. Cell phone providers 
were ordered to “suspend services in selected areas.” Id. In June 2011, the Syrian government shut down 
a large portion of internet services, Skype, Twitter, phone service, and Syria’s entire 3G mobile 
network. Liam Stack & Katherine Zoepf, Mourning a Boy, Crowds in Syria Defy Crackdown, N.Y. 
TIMES, June 3, 2011, at A1, available at 2011 WLNR 11167542. Anti-government protestors used 
communication tools to communicate and track ongoing demonstrations. Id. 
 7. Josh Halliday, David Cameron Considers Banning Suspected Rioters from Social Media, 
GUARDIAN (Aug. 11, 2011, 8:01 EDT), http://www.guardian.co.uk/media/2011/aug/11/david-cameron-
rioters-social-media?INTCMP=ILCNETTXT3487. The government, believing rioters were organized 
through the use of social media, including BlackBerry Messenger, Twitter, and Facebook, contemplated 
a ban on these services. Id. David Cameron, the British Prime Minister, said, “Police were facing a new 
circumstance where rioters were using the BlackBerry Messenger Service, a closed network, to organise 
riots . . . .” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). He further stated, “So we are working with the police, 
the intelligence services and industry to look at whether it would be right to stop people communicating 
via these websites and services when we know they are plotting violence, disorder and criminality.” Id. 
(internal quotation marks omitted). Great Britain’s proposed actions were surprising because Great 
Britain, unlike China, Iran, and Egypt, purports to respect free speech principles, and Great Britain’s 
2
Georgia State University Law Review, Vol. 29, Iss. 3 [2013], Art. 6
https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol29/iss3/6
2013] BAY AREA RAPID TRANSIT ACTIONS OF AUGUST 11, 2011 785 
 
In the summer of 2011, violent flash mobs8 developed in Chicago, 
Philadelphia, Cleveland, and Milwaukee and organized largely 
through the use of Twitter and Facebook.9 Authorities in each city 
responded by instituting curfews but did not block access to social 
media or the use of mobile communication devices.10 However, when 
San Francisco Bay Area Rapid Transit System (BART) officials 
learned of a planned protest at its stations set for the evening of 
August 11, 2011, they decided to shut down cellular and WiFi Rail11 
service to disrupt the protest.12 This event was significant: It marked 
the first time a government entity in the United States disrupted a 
                                                                                                                                      
Prime Minister had recently criticized similar governmental actions in Egypt. David D. Kirkpatrick & 
Heba Afify, For Egyptians, British Riots Are a Mix of Familiar and Peculiar, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 13, 
2011, at A9, available at 2011 WLNR 16044914; see also U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, 2010 COUNTRY 
REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES: CHINA 24 (2010), available at 
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/160451.pdf (stating that China’s “law provides for 
freedom of speech and of the press, although the government generally did not respect these rights in 
practice”); U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, 2010 COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES: EGYPT 12 
(2010), available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/160456.pdf (“[Egypt’s] constitution 
provides for freedom of speech and of the press; however, the government partially restricted these 
rights in practice . . . .”); U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, 2010 COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS 
PRACTICES: IRAN 28 (2010), available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/160461.pdf 
(“[T]he [Iranian] government severely restricted freedom of speech and of the press. There were no 
basic legal safeguards for freedom of expression . . . .”); U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, 2010 COUNTRY REPORTS 
ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES: UNITED KINGDOM 10 (2010), available at 
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/160218.pdf (stating that the United Kingdom has 
respected its laws providing for freedom of speech and the press “in almost all cases”). 
 8. Wis. State Fair Latest Target of Violent Flash Mobs, NPR (Aug. 13, 2011, 8:00 AM), 
http://www.npr.org/2011/08/13/139600667/wis-state-fair-latest-target-of-violent-flash-mobs (defining 
flash mobs as “an instantly organized crowd, usually teenagers, bent on mayhem”). 
 9. See Paul Elias, Cutting off Wireless Service Seen as One Way to Stop Violent Mobs, GLOBE & 
MAIL (Toronto), Aug. 16, 2011, at A13 available at 2011 WLNR 16182809 (describing the flash mobs 
in these cities as violent, inflicting both physical harm and property damage). The purpose of the mobs 
has “taken a criminal bent.” Chicago Flash Mobs Apparently Robbed, Attacked Four Men Over 
Weekend, HUFFPOST CHI. (June 6, 2011), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/06/06/chicago-flash-
mobs-appare_n_871924.html. 
 10. See Elias, supra note 9. Philadelphia reportedly tightened youth curfews. Id. The Cleveland City 
Council passed a bill that made it “illegal to use social media to organize a violent mob.” Id. The mayor 
vetoed the bill. Id. 
 11. WiFi Rail is the wireless internet access that is provided at select BART locations. Wireless 
Connections, BART, http://www.bart.gov/guide/wireless.aspx (last visited Feb. 3, 2013). A third-party 
contractor manages this infrastructure. Id. 
 12. See Bob Franklin & Sherwood Wakeman, A Letter from BART to Our Customers, BART (Aug. 
20, 2011), http://www.bart.gov/news/articles/2011/news20110820.aspx (detailing BART’s 
interpretation of the August 11, 2011 event). See generally BART President: Mobile Hotspots Can 
Circumvent Shutdown, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, Aug. 17, 2011, available at 2011 WLNR 
16413392 (discussing the technology involved in the August 11, 2011 BART event). 
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political protest by blocking access to cell service—a tool usually 
associated with nations without free-speech protections.13 
Digital communication technology14 is an emerging mode of 
speech that is eclipsing traditional printing press media.15 This new 
“digital speech” is widespread, almost instantaneous, and mobile—
quickly spreading ideas to a wide audience,16 and the emergence of 
this new mode of speech has the potential to impact the First 
Amendment landscape.17 Although digital speech has provided new 
means, locations, and tools for those who wish to express themselves, 
the way freedom of speech applies to this emerging technology has 
yet to be determined. 
This Note examines whether BART officials violated the First 
Amendment by shutting down mobile and WiFi Rail services to 
disrupt a planned protest on August 11, 2011. Part I of this Note 
reviews the events leading up to the planned protest, details the 
actions of the protestors and BART officials on August 11, 2011, and 
discusses the state of First Amendment law as it relates to digital 
speech.18 Part II analyzes the Supreme Court’s relevant freedom of 
speech precedents and applies them to the events of August 11, 2011, 
                                                                                                                                      
 13. See Patrik Jonsson, To Defuse ‘Flash’ Protest, BART Cuts Riders’ Cell Service. Is that Legal?, 
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Aug. 12, 2011, available at 2011 WLNR 16026693 (citing a television 
interview discussing the lack of prior incidents of this nature). 
 14. For purposes of this Note, digital communication technologies include various social media sites, 
websites, and text messages available through electronic transmissions capable of being viewed or heard 
on a smartphone, mobile phone, or other mobile electronic device. 
 15. See generally Newspapers Face a Challenging Calculus, PEW RES. CENTER (Feb. 26, 2009), 
http://pewresearch.org/pubs/1133/decline-print-newspapers-increased-online-news (attributing the 
decline in print newspapers to the use of the internet). 
 16. “Social media is a natural sweet spot for mobile since mobile devices are at the center of how 
people communicate with their circle of friends, whether by phone, text, email, or, increasingly, 
accessing social networking sites via a mobile browser.” Gonsalves, supra note 1 (internal quotation 
marks omitted). In 2010, over “two-thirds of the [United States] population [was] connected on cell 
phones.” Chilton Tippin, Cell Phone Usage Statistics 2010, SIGNAL NEWS (Sept. 23, 2010), 
http://signalnews.com/cell-phone-usage-statistics-2010. In 2010, there were 223 million mobile phone 
users over the age of thirteen in the United States and 16.7 million mobile Web users. Id. Eighteen 
percent of mobile devices were smartphones. Id. Cell service has “call setup success rates that are today 
beyond 98% and call setup times of less than 7 seconds . . . .” Martin Sauter, Call Setup Time 
Competition and LTE, WIRELESS MOVES (Nov. 21, 2010), http://mobilesociety.typepad.com/mobile_ 
life/2010/11/call-setup-time-competition-and-lte.html. 
 17. U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or 
prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of 
the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.”). 
 18. See discussion infra Part I. 
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to determine if BART’s actions were constitutional.19 In so doing, 
Part II examines whether the protestors’ actions were a protected 
class of speech, whether BART’s actions amounted to content 
discrimination, and whether the BART stations could be considered 
public forums.20 Part III asserts that current Supreme Court case law 
is inadequate to address this and similar situations, suggests that the 
Court evaluate digital speech based on its unique attributes, and 
proposes alternate and proactive means of potential protections for 
digital speech should constitutional protections fall short.21 
I. THE BART CONTROVERSY 
A. BART Police Actions Spur July 11, 2011 Demonstration 
On July 3, 2011, BART police officers allegedly shot and killed a 
transient, Charles B. Hill, who BART officials claim was armed with 
a knife and bottle.22 This shooting was the latest in a series of actions 
                                                                                                                                      
 19. See discussion infra Part II. 
 20. See discussion infra Part II. 
 21. See discussion infra Part III. Other scholars have proposed addressing the First Amendment 
concerns associated with the BART incident, flash mobs, and social media. Some authors propose 
amending Supreme Court jurisprudence (remedial) while others propose legislative solutions addressing 
either a larger digital subset (the internet and social media) or targeting different actors (flash mobs). For 
a discussion of these other proposals, see Stephen R. Elzinga, Note, Retaliatory Forum Closure, 54 
ARIZ. L. REV. 497, 539 (2012) (proposing to merge “speech-retaliation and public-forum doctrines into 
an action for retaliatory forum closure”); Jacob G. Fleming, Note, The Case for a Modern Public 
Forum: How the Bay Area Rapid Transit System’s Wireless Shutdown Strangled Free Speech Rights, 51 
WASHBURN L.J. 631, 652–61 (2012) (proposing a modern public forum); W. Danny Green, Comment, 
The First Amendment and Cell Phones: Governmental Control over Cell Phone Use on Publicly Owned 
Lands, 44 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1355 (2012) (analyzing the First Amendment issues presented in the BART 
incident); Rachel Lackert, Note, BART Cell Phone Service Shutdown: Time for a Virtual Forum?, 64 
FED. COMM. L.J. 577, 596–98 (2012) (proposing a virtual forum); Alexandra Paslawsky, Note, The 
Growth of Social Media Norms and Governments’ Attempts at Regulation, 35 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 
1485, 1491–92 (2012) (proposing that governments take internet norms into account when crafting 
social media policy); Hannah Steinblatt, Note, E-Incitement: A Framework for Regulating the 
Incitement of Criminal Flash Mobs, 22 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 753, 793 (2012) 
(suggesting lawmakers draft ordinances that “directly target and penalize those who start [flash] mobs 
that actually result in criminal activity” to control flash mobs); Brandon Wiebe, Comment, BART’s 
Unconstitutional Speech Restriction: Adapting Free Speech Principles to Absolute Wireless Censorship, 
47 U.S.F. L. REV. 195, 217 (2012) (arguing for a modification of the designated public forum to include 
government-provided Internet access). 
 22. See BART Officer Suffers Cuts, Bruises Following Officer Involved Shooting, BART (July 4, 
2011), http://www.bart.gov/news/articles/2011/news20110704.aspx; Kristin J. Bender, Rowdy Protest 
Shuts Down Three BART Stations and Causes Major Delays Throughout System, OAKLAND TRIB., July 
5
Pitzel: Bay Area Rapid Transit Actions of August 11, 2011: How Emerging D
Published by Reading Room, 2013
788 GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 29:3 
by BART police that prompted action by the protest group “No 
Justice No BART,” whose self-described mission is to raise 
awareness of what it sees as police brutality by BART officials and to 
ultimately disband that police force.23 No Justice No BART has 
organized several demonstrations at BART stations since 200924 and 
has described its protest strategy: 
[T]o exercise our freedom of assembly in such a way as to 
disrupt the “business as usual” status quo, and to continue 
organizing such events until our demands [are] met. We will 
maintain lines of communication with riders and the media, to let 
people know of the potential for disruptions in service during 
upcoming demonstrations, to explain our demands, and to 
encourage people to join us in pressuring the BART board and 
elected officials.25 
On July 11, 2011, approximately one hundred demonstrators 
organized by No Justice No BART protested at three BART 
stations.26 The protest was initially quiet and calm, with some 
protestors handing out flyers describing their group and mission, but 
the protest grew loud when some of the protestors “began screaming 
                                                                                                                                      
11, 2011, available at 2011 WLNR 13763192 (discussing the reasons for the July 11, 2011 No Justice 
No BART protest); Franklin & Wakeman, supra note 12; Vivian Ho, BART: Next Protests to Face 
‘Zero Tolerance,’ S.F. CHRON., July 13, 2011, at C7, available at 2011 WLNR 13814149 (discussing 
the genesis of July 11, 2011 protest at BART stations). 
 23. The group organized in January 2009 following the shooting death of Oscar Grant by a former 
BART police officer at a BART station on January 1, 2009. James Fang, STATEMENT: By BART Board 
President James Fang, BART (July 8, 2010), http://www.bart.gov/news/articles/2010/news20100708.as 
px; What is “No Justice No BART”?, NO JUST. NO BART, http://nojusticenobart.blogspot.com/2009/01/ 
what-is-no-justice-no-bart.html (last visited Feb. 4, 2013). No Justice No BART demands that “BART 
disband its murderous, inept, corrupt police department.” Id. 
 24. According to a spokesperson for No Justice No BART, the group has held approximately twenty 
to thirty demonstrations at BART stations since January 2009. E-mail from No Justice No BART to 
author (Oct. 12, 2011, 18:24 EST) (on file with Georgia State University Law Review). See generally 
What is No Justice No BART?, supra note 23 (discussing the history of No Justice No BART). 
 25. Our Strategy, NO JUST. NO BART, http://nojusticenobart.blogspot.com/2009/01/our-
strategy.html (last visited Feb. 4, 2013) (emphasis added). 
 26. The protest began at the Civic Center station (located near some of San Francisco’s major tourist 
attractions) and then spread to the nearby Powell Street station and the 16th Street station (located near 
the San Francisco Mission). See Bender, supra note 22 (discussing the July 11, 2011 No Justice No 
BART protest); Station List, BART, http://www.bart.gov/stations/index.aspx (last visited Feb. 4, 2013) 
(listing station locations). 
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‘cops, pigs, murderers’ and ‘no justice, no peace, disband the BART 
police,’ [while standing] on the platform.”27 Some protestors then 
blocked train doors, and one man climbed on top of a train.28 BART 
closed the station within thirty minutes.29 Some protestors then rode 
trains to two other stations forcing BART officials to close those 
stations as well.30 However, the demonstrations did not result in any 
injuries or arrests.31 
A No Justice No BART organizer viewed the protest as a success 
since it was “disruptive but peaceful.”32 The event, which occurred 
during the evening rush hour, affected transit schedules for three 
hours;33 however, the average train delay during the protest was 
seven minutes.34 BART closed the Civic Center station for thirty 
minutes and locked turnstiles at the Powell Street station for twenty 
minutes.35 BART officials responded to the July 11 protest by 
increasing the visible police presence at the stations, temporarily 
closing affected stations, and moving crowds away from the trains.36 
BART officials, irritated by the system-wide delays and safety 
hazards caused by protesters on crowded platforms near high-speed 
trains, stated that there would be “zero tolerance” for these kinds of 
protests in the future.37 
B. August 11, 2011 Protest 
On August 11, 2011, No Justice No BART again planned to 
protest at BART stations during the evening commute.38 According 
to official statements, BART personnel learned of the planned protest 
                                                                                                                                      
 27. Bender, supra note 22 (discussing the No Justice No BART protests on July 11, 2011). 
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Ho, supra note 22. 
 31. Bender, supra note 22. 
 32. Ho, supra note 22 (reporting what a protest organizer thought of the demonstrations). 
 33. Bender, supra note 22. BART “carries 190,000 passengers during the morning and evening 
commutes every day.” Protests in San Francisco Go on Without New Wireless Shutdowns, HONOLULU 
STAR-ADVERTISER, Aug. 16, 2011, available at 2011 WLNR 16356150. 
 34. Ho, supra note 22. 
 35. Bender, supra note 22. 
 36. Id. 
 37. See Ho, supra note 22. 
 38. See Jonsson, supra note 13. 
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on the organizer’s website, which publicly posted the organization’s 
plans to hold a protest at one of the stations beginning at 4:30 p.m.39 
The website stated the organizers planned to use cell phones once on 
BART property to further coordinate the protest.40 In response, 
BART officials decided to cut cell phone and WiFi Rail service at the 
potentially affected subway stations just prior to the time of the 
planned protest.41 BART officially stated that it used these tactics to 
“ensure the safety of everyone on the platform.”42 However, internal 
BART communications suggest that BART officials’ decision to shut 
down cell service was hastily planned with little discussion of the 
consequences.43 No Justice No BART also questioned BART’s 
motives, suggesting BART’s tactics were not aimed at safety but at 
disrupting their protest message.44 BART’s strategy was successful, 
and the protest never materialized.45 BART restored cell service by 
7:00 p.m.46 
                                                                                                                                      
 39. BART Protest Could Impact Evening Commute, NBC BAY AREA (Aug. 11, 2011, 3:18 PM), 
http://www.nbcbayarea.com/news/local/BART-Protest-Could-Impact-Evening-Commute-
127554708.html; Franklin & Wakeman, supra note 12. 
 40. Franklin & Wakeman, supra note 12 (stating that the protestors planned to communicate while at 
different stations and text the location of BART authorities to each other). 
 41. Id.; Statement on Temporary Wireless Service Interruption in Select BART Stations on Aug. 11, 
BART (Aug. 12, 2011), http://www.bart.gov/news/articles/2011/news20110812.aspx [hereinafter 
Statement]; see also BART President: Mobile Hotspots Can Circumvent Shutdown, supra note 12 
(describing plans to shut down the WiFi Rail system). 
 42. Statement, supra note 41. BART officials cited safety concerns regarding potential falls from 
overcrowded platforms onto the trackway that contains an electrified third rail and is located five feet 
below the platforms. Franklin & Wakeman, supra note 12. BART’s deputy police chief, Benson Fairow, 
stated that “he decided to switch off the service out of concern that protesters on station platforms could 
clash with commuters, create panicked surges of passengers, and put themselves or others in the way of 
speeding trains or the high-voltage third rails. ‘It was a recipe for disaster’ . . . .” Michael Cabanatuan, 
BART Admits Halting Cell Service to Stop Protests, S.F. CHRON. (Sept. 28, 2012), 
http://www.sfgate.com/default/article/BART-admits-halting-cell-service-to-stop-protests-2335114.php; 
see also Fleming, supra note 21, at 635 n.24. 
 43. Zusha Elinson, BART Cut Cell Service on Spur of the Moment, Emails Show, BAY CITIZEN (S.F.) 
(Oct. 11, 2011), http://www.baycitizen.org/bart-protests/story/bart-cut-cell-service-spur-moment-emails/ 
(“The discussion of the idea lasted between 15 and 30 minutes.”); see also Jennifer Spencer, Note, No 
Service: Free Speech, the Communications Act, and BART’s Cell Phone Network Shutdown, 27 
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 767, 769, 771 (2012) (discussing BART’s internal communications regarding the 
cell phone shutdown). 
 44. See Response to BART’s Illegal Blackout of Phone Service, NO JUST. NO BART, 
http://nojusticenobart.blogspot.com/2011/08/our-statement-on-network-blackout-on.html (last visited 
Feb. 5, 2013). 
 45. Elias, supra note 9; Jonsson, supra note 13. 
 46. Franklin & Wakeman, supra note 12. 
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BART accomplished the cell phone shutdown by cutting power to 
the station’s underground nodes that relay cell service to above 
ground transmitters.47 The subterranean platform levels and some of 
the concourse levels of the affected stations lost cell service.48 BART 
owns the underground nodes and rents them to various cellular 
providers.49 BART notified the cell providers prior to cutting the 
power.50 
C. Jurisdiction And Governing Laws 
BART is a California “public agency” that was chartered by the 
California legislature in 1957 and is governed by California’s Public 
Utility Code.51 BART has an anti-demonstration policy: “No person 
                                                                                                                                      
 47. Robert Barnes, A First Amendment Collision on the San Francisco Subway, WASH. POST, Aug. 
29, 2011, at A13, available at 2011 WLNR 17064798; see also Elias, supra note 9; Franklin & 
Wakeman, supra note 12. 
 48. Passengers at street level and aboveground stations continued to have cell reception because 
outside signals could reach those areas. See Franklin & Wakeman, supra note 12. 
 49. See Barnes, supra note 47. BART began providing cell phone coverage at their stations through 
a contract with local wireless carriers in 2005. See generally Michael Cabanatuan, Underground, but 
Not Unconnected—BART Offers Wireless Service to Riders, S.F. CHRON. (Nov. 19, 2005, 4:00 AM), 
http://www.sfgate.com/bayarea/article/Underground-but-not-unconnected-BART-offers-2594271.php 
(discussing BART’s wireless coverage); Wireless Connections, supra note 11 (describing mobile 
technologies at BART stations). 
 50. Franklin & Wakeman, supra note 12. Linton Johnson, a BART spokesman, said shutting off 
underground cell service is “allowable under an agreement with several major phone service providers 
that pay rent to BART.” Rachel Gordon et al., Protests Shut BART Stations in S.F.—This Time the Cell 
Phones Stay on, S.F. CHRON., Aug. 16, 2011, at A1, available at 2011 WLNR 16177189. BART cut 
power to the nodes rather than jamming the signal. Jonsson, supra note 13. “A jammer can block all 
radio communications on any device that operates on radio frequencies within its range (i.e., within a 
certain radius of the jammer) by emitting radio frequency waves that prevent the targeted device from 
establishing or maintaining a connection.” GPS, Wi-Fi, and Cell Phone Jammers: Frequently Asked 
Questions (FAQs), FCC.GOV, http://transition.fcc.gov/eb/jammerenforcement/jamfaq.pdf (last visited 
Feb. 5, 2013). Jamming cell phone signals is illegal under the Telecommunications Act of 1996 because 
it transmits radio waves that interfere with authorized radio communications. 47 U.S.C. § 333 (2006) 
(“No person shall willfully or maliciously interfere with or cause interference to any radio 
communications of any station licensed or authorized by or under this chapter or operated by the United 
States Government.”). 
 51. See CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE §§ 28509, 28600 (West 2011); A History of BART: The Concept Is 
Born, BART, http://www.bart.gov/about/history/index.aspx (last visited Feb. 5, 2013). Section 28600 of 
the California Utility Code created the San Francisco Bay Area Rapid Transit District. PUB. UTIL. 
§ 28600. The Code defines “district” as “a transit district formed under this part.” Id. § 24503. BART is 
also considered a “public agency.” See id. §§ 207, 24503, 28509. A “‘[p]ublic agency’ includes a city, 
city and county, a county, the State of California, or any public district organized under the laws of the 
State of California or any agency or authority of any thereof.” Id. § 24509. The state code also 
authorizes the creation of BART’s police department and defines their power and authority under the 
9
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shall conduct or participate in assemblies or demonstrations or 
engage in other expressive activities in the paid areas of BART 
stations, including BART cars and trains and BART station 
platforms.”52 However, “expressive activities” are allowed in certain 
designated areas.53 California regulations also allow the transit 
authority to impose a penalty for “[w]illfully disturbing others on or 
in a system facility or vehicle by engaging in boisterous or unruly 
behavior . . . ; [and] willfully blocking the free movement of another 
person in a system facility or vehicle.”54 Even if BART officials 
complied with BART and state policies and regulations when 
shutting down cell service, their actions still may have resulted in a 
violation of First Amendment rights. 
D. First Amendment History 
The First Amendment provides for “freedom of speech.”55 In its 
decisions during the past century, the Supreme Court has attempted 
to delineate the limits of free speech56 but, in the process, has created 
                                                                                                                                      
state’s Penal Code. Id. § 28767.5. 
 52. Statement, supra note 41. 
 53. Id. 
 54. PUB. UTIL. § 99580. 
 55. U.S. CONST. amend. I. There are five clauses in the First Amendment, each with their own line 
of Supreme Court interpretation, but this Note focuses only on freedom of speech issues. 
 56. In 1925, the Supreme Court held that the First Amendment can be applied to the states through 
application of the Fourteenth Amendment; however, few Supreme Court decisions regarding free speech 
issues further defined the doctrine until World War I. See Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 
(1925) (“[W]e may and do assume that freedom of speech and of the press—which are protected by the 
First Amendment from abridgment by Congress—are among the fundamental personal rights and 
‘liberties’ protected by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment from impairment by the 
States.”); DANIEL A. FARBER, THE FIRST AMENDMENT 11 (3d ed. 2010); KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN & 
GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 763 (17th ed. 2010). Around that time, the Court generally 
heard political speech cases related to socialism, overthrowing the government, or resisting the war. See 
generally Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 371 (1927), overruled by Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 
444 (1969) (discussing whether the Syndicalism Act violated the right of freedom of speech); Gitlow, 
268 U.S. at 670 (discussing whether a statute prohibiting criminal anarchy violated defendant’s right to 
freedom of speech); Schaefer v. United States, 251 U.S. 466, 474 (1920) (discussing whether a person’s 
conviction under the Espionage Act violated his right to freedom of speech); Abrams v. United States, 
250 U.S. 616, 619 (1919) (discussing whether the Espionage Act is unconstitutional because it is in 
conflict with the First Amendment). During the 1950s and 1960s, the Court began expanding the 
definition of what constitutes protected speech. See generally Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973) 
(providing a new test of what constitutes obscenity); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 448–49 (1969) 
(holding that Ohio’s Criminal Syndicalism Act violated the First Amendment and articulating a new 
standard for incitement); N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (expanding upon what First 
10
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“an endless maze” of tests and definitions to assess what constitutes 
protected speech.57 Although First Amendment doctrine expanded in 
the twentieth century,58 there is little Supreme Court case law 
regarding free speech rights relating to digital communications and 
no precedent regarding termination of cell service to disrupt the 
organization of a protest.59 Communication methods have evolved 
over time from the printing press to the digital age, but First 
Amendment jurisprudence has not kept pace. Therefore, the events of 
August 11, 2011 must be analyzed under existing First Amendment 
tests.60 
E. Implicated First Amendment Principles 
1. Protected Classes of Speech 
The initial inquiry in First Amendment analysis is to determine 
whether the speech is protected speech or is unprotected, “low value” 
speech.61 In Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire,62 the Supreme Court said 
                                                                                                                                      
Amendment protections are afforded to libelous speech); FARBER, supra, at 12. 
 57. David L. Hudson, Jr., The Secondary Effects Doctrine: “The Evisceration of First Amendment 
Freedoms,” 37 WASHBURN L.J. 55, 55 (1997) (“First Amendment jurisprudence has been described as 
‘an endless maze’ with ‘no general framework.’”); see also FARBER, supra note 56, at 11–12; 
 58. See cases cited supra note 56. 
 59. Only a few cases regarding regulation of internet content have reached the Supreme Court. Some 
of these include: Ashcroft v. ACLU, 542 U.S. 656, 673 (2004) (holding the Child Online Protection Act 
violated the First Amendment by burdening adults’ access to some protected speech); United States v. 
Am. Library Ass’n, Inc., 539 U.S. 194, 220 (2003) (holding the Children’s Internet Protection Act did 
not violate freedom of speech); Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997) (holding the Communications 
Decency Act was a content-based speech restriction and was facially overbroad in violation of the First 
Amendment). 
 60. See Hudson, supra note 57, at 57 (discussing the three primary First Amendment principles: 
categorization of the type of speech involved; determination of the type of forum; and analysis of 
content discrimination). It has been suggested that the public forum doctrine is the only applicable First 
Amendment test to apply to the BART situation. See Fleming, supra note 21, at 648–49. However, this 
Note argues that the emergence and unique characteristics of digital technology, particularly as applied 
to the BART incident, make the analysis of each of the three primary First Amendment principles 
relevant. 
 61. FARBER, supra note 56, at 14 (stating the first step in a First Amendment analysis is determining 
if the speech is within an “unprotected category of speech”); Geoffrey R. Stone, Content Regulation and 
the First Amendment, 25 WM. & MARY L. REV. 189, 194 (1984) (opining that defining the type of 
speech is an important first inquiry in a content-based analysis because “low” value speech is “deserving 
of only limited constitutional protection”). 
 62. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571 (1942). 
11
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freedom of speech is not an absolute right.63 There are some classes 
of speech that are not constitutionally protected64 because the 
benefits of the speech are “clearly outweighed by the social interest 
in order and morality.”65 
One type of unprotected speech is speech that incites a breach of 
the peace.66 In Schenck v. United States,67 the Court clarified that to 
be lawfully censored, inciting speech must pose a “clear and present” 
danger to society.68 In Brandenburg v. Ohio,69 the Court redefined 
the clear and present danger test to its modern form—the 
Brandenburg test: a clear and present danger is posed, justifying 
suppression of speech, when the speech advocating “use of force or 
of law violation . . . is directed to inciting or producing imminent 
lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action.”70 
                                                                                                                                      
 63. Id. (“[T]he right of free speech is not absolute at all times and under all circumstances.”). 
 64. Id. at 571–72. The Supreme Court stated: 
There are certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the prevention and 
punishment of which have never been thought to raise any Constitutional problem. These 
include the lewd and obscene, the profane, the libelous, and the insulting or ‘fighting’ 
words—those which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate 
breach of the peace. 
Id. Through case law, the Court has expanded what constitutes unprotected, low value classes of speech 
to include: incitement, obscenity, fraud, defamation, fighting words, child pornography, speech integral 
to criminal conduct, commercial speech, and true threats. See United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 
1584 (2010); New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 764 (1982) (child pornography); Va. State Bd. of 
Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 770 (1976) (commercial speech); 
Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 707 (1969) (true threats); Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 565 (fighting 
words). 
 65. Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 572. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919). 
 68. Id. at 52 (stating that when determining if speech is unprotected, “proximity and degree,” and 
whether the speech is “used in such circumstances and . . . such a nature as to create a clear and present 
danger that [it] will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent” are the critical 
inquiries). The Court in Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 513–14 (1951), applied a refined version 
of the clear and present danger test in upholding the Smith Act. The Court’s revised test was “whether 
the gravity of the ‘evil,’ discounted by its improbability, justifies such invasion of free speech as is 
necessary to avoid the danger.” Id. at 510. 
 69. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, (1969) (evaluating the conviction of a Ku Klux Klan leader 
who violated an Ohio Criminal Syndicalism Statute). 
 70. Id. at 447–49 (holding a statute was unconstitutional because it did not distinguish between 
“mere advocacy” and “incitement to imminent lawless action”). Since Brandenburg, there have been 
few Supreme Court decisions expanding upon the meaning of the Brandenburg test. See Marc Rohr, 
Grand Illusion?, 38 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 1, 10 (2002) (discussing the lack of Supreme Court decisions 
clarifying the Brandenburg test). However, in one such case, Hess v. Indiana, the Supreme Court 
emphasized that it was not enough that speech had a “tendency to lead to violence” but required that the 
speech be “intended to produce, and likely to produce, imminent disorder.” Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 
12
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Although Chaplinsky articulated the general principle that certain 
categories of unprotected speech were outside the scope of First 
Amendment protection, the Supreme Court later held that low value 
speech may receive protection in certain circumstances.71 In R.A.V. v. 
City of St. Paul,72 the Court stated that even restrictions on low value 
speech must not be based on content-based distinctions.73 
2. Content-Based Discrimination 
Another increasingly important freedom of speech consideration is 
whether the government action or regulation is content-based or 
content-neutral.74 This is a crucial inquiry75 because there is a strong 
presumption that a content-based law is invalid.76 “[A]bove all else, 
                                                                                                                                      
105, 108–09 (1973) (overturning the conviction since his words “amounted to nothing more than 
advocacy of illegal action at some indefinite future time”). In Hess, an anti-war demonstrator was 
convicted of disorderly conduct. Id. at 105–07. During the demonstration, the police ordered the crowd 
of approximately one hundred demonstrators to clear the street. Id. at 106. When the police passed Hess, 
he exclaimed, “We’ll take the fucking street later,” or “We’ll take the fucking street again.” Id. at 107. 
 71. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Content Neutrality as a Central Problem of Freedom of Speech: 
Problems in the Supreme Court’s Application, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 49, 62 (2000) (stating that content-
based restrictions on unprotected categories of speech receive strict scrutiny and are the exception to the 
general rule that unprotected speech receives rational basis review). 
 72. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992). 
 73. Id. at 383–84 (stating that unprotected speech can be “regulated because of their constitutionally 
proscribable content (obscenity, defamation, etc.)—not that they are categories of speech entirely 
invisible to the Constitution”). 
 74. See Chemerinsky, supra note 71, at 53 (“Today, virtually every free speech case turns on the 
application of the distinction between content-based and content-neutral laws.”); Geoffrey R. Stone, 
Content-Neutral Restrictions, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 46, 48 (1987) (“[T]he Court almost invariably reaches 
the same result—content-based restrictions of ‘high value’ speech are unconstitutional.”); Stone, supra 
note 61, at 196 (stating that but for a few exceptions, “the Court has invalidated almost every content-
based restriction that it has considered in the past quarter-century”). 
 75. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 642 (1994) (“Deciding whether a particular 
regulation is content based or content neutral is not always a simple task.”). 
 76. R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 382 (holding “content-based regulations are presumptively invalid”). 
However, there are some instances dealing with public forum issues where the Court has upheld 
government regulations. See Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 530, 538–39 
(1980) (discussing Greer v. Spock and Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights); Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 
828, 840 (1976) (holding that the government may regulate speech at a military base if that speech 
would disrupt the property’s legitimate governmental purpose); Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 
U.S. 298, 304 (1974) (holding that a public transit system that rented out advertising space on its buses 
did not have to accept partisan political advertising). Another exception to the general principle that 
content-based laws are presumptively invalid is described by the secondary effects doctrine: a regulation 
that appears on its face to discriminate based on content is not deemed to be content-based if the 
regulation is targeted towards the “secondary effects” of that speech. See City of Renton v. Playtime 
Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 46, 47, 60 n.4 (1986) (discussing the secondary effects of an adult theater 
13
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the First Amendment means that government has no power to restrict 
expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its 
content.”77 A government law is generally deemed content-based if it 
is restricted because of its subject matter or viewpoint.78 Content-
neutral laws are those made “without reference to the content of the 
regulated speech.”79 If a government restriction is content-based, it 
receives strict scrutiny: the government action must be narrowly 
tailored to meet a compelling state interest.80 In contrast,81 content-
neutral laws are generally subject to intermediate scrutiny.82 
The government may place reasonable83 time, place, and manner 
restrictions on speech, so long as the regulations are content-
                                                                                                                                      
location, such as increased crime, and stating that under the secondary effects doctrine, the level of 
scrutiny is the same as that for content-neutral laws: the restriction must be narrowly tailored, designed 
to serve a substantial governmental interest, and allow for reasonable alternative avenues of 
communication); Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 321 (1988) (stating that if picketing regulations had been 
justified by concerns about congestion, interference with ingress or egress, visual clutter, or security, the 
secondary effects doctrine may have applied). 
 77. Police Dep’t of Chi. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972); see also Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 
414 (1989) (stating the “bedrock principle underlying the First Amendment . . . is that the government 
may not prohibit the expression of an idea simply because society finds the idea itself offensive or 
disagreeable”). 
 78. Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 723 (2000) (declaring that subject matter regulation is content-
based discrimination); Turner Broad. Sys., 512 U.S. at 643 (stating that content-based laws make 
distinctions based on the ideas or views expressed); Consol. Edison Co., 447 U.S. at 537 (stating that 
restrictions against “public discussion of an entire topic” as well as viewpoint constitute content-based 
discrimination); see also Mosley, 408 U.S. at 93, 95, 99 (overturning a Chicago ordinance that 
prohibited picketing within 100 feet of a school but had an exception for peaceful picketing in 
connection with a labor dispute because the ordinance described permissible picketing in terms of its 
subject matter). 
 79. See Playtime Theatres, 475 U.S. at 48. 
 80. For a discussion of the level of scrutiny applied to content-based restrictions of speech, see 
Consol. Edison Co., 447 U.S. at 543–44 (“Mere speculation of harm does not constitute a compelling 
state interest.”); Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2738 (2011); R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 
395–96 (1992); Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 
118, 123 (1991). 
 81. For a discussion of one theory explaining why there are different standards for content-based and 
content-neutral laws, see Stone, supra note 74, at 54. 
 82. Turner Broad. Sys., 512 U.S. at 642; see also Turner Broad. Sys. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180, 189 
(1997) (“[A] content-neutral regulation will be sustained . . . if it advances important governmental 
interests unrelated to the suppression of free speech and does not burden substantially more speech than 
necessary to further those interests.”). 
 83. See Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 116–17 (1972) (commenting that reasonableness 
is based on “[t]he nature of a place, [and] the pattern of its normal activities,” and the essential inquiry is 
“whether the manner of expression is basically incompatible with the normal activity of a particular 
place at a particular time”). 
14
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neutral.84 These restrictions must be based on legitimate government 
interests, such as regulating traffic and securing public order.85 
Reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions must also be justified 
without reference to the content of the regulated speech, be narrowly 
tailored86 to serve a substantial governmental interest,87 and leave 
open ample channels for communication of information.88 
                                                                                                                                      
 84. See Consol. Edison Co., 447 U.S. at 536 (“Therefore, a constitutionally permissible time, place, 
or manner restriction may not be based upon either the content or subject matter of speech.”); Linmark 
Assocs. v. Twp. of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85, 93 (1977) (“[L]aws regulating the time, place, or manner 
of speech stand on a different footing from laws prohibiting speech altogether.”); Va. State Bd. of 
Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 771 (1976) (“We have often approved 
[time, place, and manner] restrictions . . . provided that they are justified without reference to the content 
of the regulated speech, that they serve a significant governmental interest, and that in so doing they 
leave open ample alternative channels for communication of the information.”). 
 85. Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 576 (1941) (holding time, place, and manner restrictions 
placed on a parade license were constitutional because they were based on the city’s legitimate interests 
in regulating traffic and securing public order); see also Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 88–89 (1949) 
(stating the government has a legitimate interest in the “comfort and convenience” of its citizens). Other 
examples of time, place, and manner restrictions include Grayned, where the Court upheld a noise 
ordinance because it advanced the city’s “interest in having an undisrupted school session conducive to 
the students’ learning.” Grayned, 408 U.S. at 119. In Cox v. Louisiana, the Court upheld a ban on street 
demonstrations during rush hour since they “might put an intolerable burden on the essential flow of 
traffic.” Id. at 115–16 (citing Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 554 (1965)). In Kovacs, the Court held the 
government could regulate over-amplified loudspeakers. Kovacs, 336 U.S. at 88–89. In Members of City 
Council of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789 (1984), the Court stated the city could 
regulate signs on utility poles when it is trying to improve aesthetics and is not suppressing ideas. Id. at 
805, 807. 
 86. See, e.g., Schneider v. New Jersey, 308 U.S. 147, 162–63 (1939) (declaring unconstitutional an 
ordinance restricting hand billing on the basis that discarded leaflets would cause litter because there 
were alternative means, other than restricting speech, to prevent littering—such as punishing those who 
actually threw the leaflets into the street); see also Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 726 (2000) (“[W]hen 
a content-neutral regulation does not entirely foreclose any means of communication, it may satisfy the 
tailoring requirement even though it is not the least restrictive or least intrusive means of serving the 
statutory goal.”). But see Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 800 (1989) (“‘A complete ban 
can be narrowly tailored but only if each activity within the proscription’s scope is an appropriately 
targeted evil.’” (quoting Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 485 (1988))); Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San 
Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 493, 515–16 (1981) (invalidating San Diego’s billboard ordinance saying it was 
not an appropriate time, place, and manner restriction because it allowed for some signs, but the 
prohibited signs were “banned everywhere and at all times”). 
 87. Heffron v. Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640, 650 (1981) (“As a general 
matter, it is clear that a State’s interest in protecting the ‘safety and convenience’ of persons using a 
public forum is a valid governmental objective.”). In Heffron, the Court says the significance of the 
governmental interest should be assessed by considering the nature and function of the particular forum. 
Id. at 651. Since the small fairgrounds drew large crowds, “the State’s interest in the orderly movement 
and control of such an assembly of persons is a substantial consideration.” Id. at 650. 
 88. Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984); see also City of Ladue v. 
Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43, 56 (1994) (holding the city’s ordinance which prohibited homeowners from 
displaying most types of yard signs was unconstitutional because it did not “leave open ample 
alternative channels for communication”). The City of Ladue argued that there were other means 
15
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3. Public Forum Doctrine 
Another important analysis involves government action taken as a 
proprietor or patron.89 There is a three-part framework for analyzing 
First Amendment issues involving government-owned property.90 
The Supreme Court categorizes government property in three ways: 
(1) as a public forum; (2) as a designated public forum; or (3) as a 
non-public forum and applies a different standard of review to each 
forum.91 
A public forum is government property that has been traditionally 
open to expression.92 Parks and streets are examples of traditional 
public forums.93 Speech restrictions in these forums are reviewed 
                                                                                                                                      
available for homeowners to express themselves, including bumper stickers, flyers, etc.; however, the 
Court disagreed because yard signs were “venerable” and had “long been an important and distinct 
medium of expression,” and therefore, there were no “adequate substitutes . . . for the important medium 
of speech that Ladue has closed off.” Id. at 54–56. 
 89. See Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 678 (1992) (“But it is also 
well settled that the government need not permit all forms of speech on property that it owns and 
controls.”); United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720, 725 (1990) (“It is a long-settled principle that 
governmental actions are subject to a lower level of First Amendment scrutiny when ‘the governmental 
function operating . . . [is] not the power to regulate or license, as lawmaker, . . . but, rather, as 
proprietor, to manage [its] internal operation[s] . . . .’” (alteration in original) (citation omitted)). 
 90. Kokinda, 497 U.S. at 726 (announcing a “tripartite framework” for analyzing First Amendment 
issues involving government property). 
 91. See Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, 505 U.S. at 678–79; Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. 
& Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 802 (1985) (identifying the types of public forums); Perry Educ. 
Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 44–46 (1983) (stating different standards should be 
applied based on the type of property involved). But see U.S. Postal Serv. v. Council of Greenburgh 
Civic Ass’ns, 453 U.S. 114, 129 (1981) (noting that being government property does not automatically 
open that property to the public). 
 92. See Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, 505 U.S. at 678; Perry, 460 U.S. at 45; Hague v. 
Comm. for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939) (stating that public spaces that have “immemorially 
been held in trust for the use of the public and, time out of mind, [and] have been used for purposes of 
assembly, communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing public questions” are considered 
traditional public forums). 
 93. Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 803–04. Letter boxes and military bases have been excluded from the list 
of traditional public forums. See Greenburgh, 453 U.S. at 133 (holding that letter boxes were not public 
forums); Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 838 (1976) (discussing military bases). In Board of Airport 
Commissioners v. Jews for Jesus, Inc., 482 U.S. 569 (1987), the Court did not reach the question of 
whether an airport is a public forum; however, in International Society for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 
the Court held that an airport is not a public forum because “the tradition of airport activity does not 
demonstrate that airports have historically been made available for speech activity,” and there was no 
evidence “that these particular terminals, or airport terminals generally, have been intentionally opened 
by their operators to such activity . . . .” Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, 505 U.S. at 680. 
Furthermore, the Court stated that “[a]s commercial enterprises, airports must provide services attractive 
to the marketplace. . . . [And therefore,] an airport terminal [does not have] as a principal purpose 
promoting the free exchange of ideas.” Id. at 682 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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using “the highest scrutiny.”94 For content-based exclusions of 
speech, the government “must show that its regulation is necessary to 
serve a compelling state interest and that it is narrowly drawn to 
achieve that end.”95 Content-neutral restrictions must be “narrowly 
tailored to serve a significant government interest, and leave open 
ample alternative channels of communication.”96 
The second type of forum is a designated public forum.97 The 
government creates these forums by intentionally98 designating a 
place or means of communication as a public forum through policy 
or practice.99 Further, the government must grant general access to 
these forums.100 Like traditional public forums, designated public 
forums are subject to strict scrutiny.101 “Reasonable time, place and 
manner regulations are permissible, and a content-based prohibition 
must be narrowly drawn to effectuate a compelling state interest.”102 
                                                                                                                                      
The Court cautioned, however, that one should not automatically equate airports with other 
“transportation nodes.” Id. at 681–82 (“To blithely equate airports with other transportation centers, 
therefore, would be a mistake.”). 
 94. See Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, 505 U.S. at 678. 
 95. Perry, 460 U.S. at 45; see also Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 800. 
 96. Perry, 460 U.S. at 45; see also Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 800; Greenburgh, 453 U.S. at 132. 
 97. See Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, 505 U.S. at 678; Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 803; Perry, 
460 U.S. at 45. 
 98. See Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 802 (“The government does not create a public forum by inaction . . . 
but only by intentionally opening a nontraditional forum for public discourse.”). “The Court has also 
examined the nature of the property and its compatibility with expressive activity to discern the 
government’s intent.” Id. 
 99. See Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 267 (1981) (discussing how a state university created a 
designated public forum by allowing student groups to use the university’s meeting facilities). But see 
Perry, 460 U.S. at 45 (finding a school’s internal mail system was not a designated public forum 
because the school board did not grant general access to this system). In Perry, the school’s mail system 
was used by outside groups; however, those groups had to first secure permission from the school 
principal, and there was no evidence the system was open for use by the public. Id. at 47. The Court 
further stated, “If by policy or by practice the Perry School District has opened its mail system for 
indiscriminate use by the general public, then PLEA could justifiably argue a public forum has been 
created.” Id. However, even when the state is not required to open the forum, if it does it must adhere to 
“the same standards as apply in a traditional public forum.” Id. at 46. 
 100. Perry, 460 U.S. at 45–47. 
 101. See Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, 505 U.S. at 678 (“Regulation of [a designated forum] 
is subject to the same limitations as that governing a traditional public forum.”); United States v. 
Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720, 726–27 (1990) (“Regulation of speech on property that the Government has 
expressly dedicated to speech activity is also examined under strict scrutiny.”); Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 
800 (“[W]hen the Government has intentionally designated a place or means of communication as a 
public forum speakers cannot be excluded without a compelling governmental interest.”). 
 102. Perry, 460 U.S. at 46. 
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The third type of forum is the non-public forum.103 All other types 
of public property are categorized as a non-public forum,104 where 
the government is allowed to regulate speech.105 “In addition to time, 
place, and manner regulations, the state may reserve the forum for its 
intended purposes, communicative or otherwise, as long as the 
regulation on speech is reasonable and not an effort to suppress 
expression merely because public officials oppose the speaker’s 
view.”106 
Taken together, categorizing the type of speech involved, 
determining the type of forum at issue, and analyzing whether the 
government action is content-based comprise the heart of First 
Amendment analysis.107 
II. DID BART VIOLATE COMMUTERS’ RIGHT OF FREEDOM OF 
SPEECH? 
A. The BART Shutdown And Protected Forms Of Speech 
To determine if BART’s action of disabling cell service was 
constitutional, the first inquiry108 is whether No Justice No BART’s 
speech is an unprotected form of speech, and the only category of 
unprotected speech it might qualify as is speech that constitutes 
incitement.109 The Brandenburg test controls the analysis for 
incitement cases,110 and it puts forth three requirements: (1) express 
advocacy of law violation, (2) an immediate call for law violation, 
and (3) a likelihood that the violation will occur.111 
                                                                                                                                      
 103. See Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, 505 U.S. at 678–79. 
 104. See id. 
 105. See id. at 679 (“Limitations on expressive activity conducted on this last category of property 
must survive only a much more limited review.”); Kokinda, 497 U.S. at 727 (stating that in non-public 
forums, government action is “examined only for reasonableness”). 
 106. Perry, 460 U.S. at 46. 
 107. See Hudson, supra note 57, at 57. 
 108. See FARBER, supra note 56, at 14. 
 109. The incitement standard is derived from Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969). 
 110. Id. at 447 (“[C]onstitutional guarantees of free speech and free press do not permit a State to 
forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of force or of law violation except where such advocacy is 
directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such 
action.”). 
 111. Rohr, supra note 70, at 14 (citing Bernard Schwartz’s take on the Brandenburg test in Holmes 
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The first Brandenburg element asks whether No Justice No BART 
expressly advocated violation of the law.112 California Penal Code 
section 640 makes willfully disturbing or willfully blocking others 
within a public transportation system an infraction subject to an 
administrative penalty, a fine, imprisonment, or both fine and 
imprisonment,113 and California Penal Code section 407 defines 
unlawful assembly as two or more persons assembled “to do an 
unlawful act, or do a lawful act in a violent, boisterous, or tumultuous 
manner.”114 Other related illegal acts include riots and routs.115 No 
Justice No BART probably was not advocating for the degree of 
force or violence necessary for a violation of the riot or rout 
statutes116 because the group’s policy statement says the organization 
promotes peaceful, albeit disruptive protests,117 and its recent prior 
                                                                                                                                      
Versus Hand: Clear and Present Danger or Advocacy of Unlawful Action?, 1994 SUP. CT. REV. 209, 
240 (1994)). 
 112. See Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 447 (emphasis added) (describing the standard for incitement as 
“use of force or of law violation . . . directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is 
likely to incite or produce such action”); Rohr, supra note 70, at 14. 
 113. CAL. PENAL CODE § 640 (West, Westlaw through 2012 Reg. Sess.). The statute states: 
Any of the acts described in subdivision (d) shall be punishable by a fine . . . by 
imprisonment . . . or by both . . . . 
. . . . 
(d)(1) Willfully disturbing others on or in a system facility or vehicle by engaging in 
boisterous or unruly behavior. 
. . . . 
(4) Willfully blocking the free movement of another person in a system facility or 
vehicle. This paragraph shall not be interpreted to affect any lawful activities permitted or 
First Amendment rights protected under the laws of this state or applicable federal law 
. . . . 
. . . . 
(e) Notwithstanding subdivision (a), a public transportation agency . . . may enact and 
enforce an ordinance providing that a person who [willfully disturbed or blocked others] 
. . . be afforded an opportunity to complete an administrative process that imposes only 
an administrative penalty enforced in a civil proceeding. 
Id. 
 114. Id. § 407. 
 115. Id. § 408 (“Every person who participates in any rout or unlawful assembly is guilty of a 
misdemeanor.”) A riot is an imminent threat to use force or violence by two or more persons and is 
punishable by fine, imprisonment or both. Id. §§ 404–05. A rout is an advance to commit a riot and is 
considered a misdemeanor. Id. §§ 406 (“Whenever two or more persons, assembled and acting together, 
make any attempt or advance toward the commission of an act which would be a riot if actually 
committed, such assembly is a rout.”). 
 116. Threat of force or violence is necessary to violate California’s riot or rout statutes. Id. §§ 404, 
406. 
 117. See Ho, supra note 22 (reporting that a No Justice No BART protest organizer viewed prior 
BART protests to be a success because they were “disruptive but peaceful”); Our Strategy, supra note 
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protest did not result in this type of violent behavior.118 If the group 
was asking protestors to physically disrupt train service,119 this would 
be advocating a willful disturbance and an illegal assembly in 
violation of California Penal Code sections 407 and 640.120 
It is unclear whether Brandenburg’s “lawless action” standard121 
includes non-violent misdemeanor conduct. In Terminiello v. City of 
Chicago,122 a fighting words case, the Court stated that “freedom of 
speech, though not absolute, is nevertheless protected against 
censorship or punishment, unless shown likely to produce a clear and 
present danger of a serious substantive evil that rises far above public 
inconvenience, annoyance, or unrest.”123 In Hess v. Indiana,124 the 
Court stated that “words could not be punished by the State on the 
ground that they had ‘a tendency to lead to violence.’”125 However, 
because Terminiello concerned fighting words126 while Hess focused 
on imminence,127 the nature of “lawless activity” remains unclear. 
Assuming, arguendo, the speech in the planned BART action 
advocated lawless activity, the next step is to determine if the lawless 
action was imminent.128 The protest was reportedly planned to begin 
at 4:30 p.m. on August 11, 2011.129 Unlike Hess, where the protestor 
                                                                                                                                      
25. 
 118. Bender, supra note 22 (reporting no injuries or arrests at the July 2011 protest). 
 119. No Justice No BART protestors engaged in this type of protest on July 3, 2011 when they 
physically blocked train doors so train service would be interrupted. See Franklin & Wakeman, supra 
note 12. No protestors were arrested at this event. Bender, supra note 22. 
 120. PENAL §§ 407, 640. 
 121. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (describing the standard for speech inducing 
incitement as “use of force or of law violation . . . directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless 
action and is likely to incite or produce such action”). 
 122. Terminiello v. City of Chi., 337 U.S. 1 (1949). 
 123. Id. at 4 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). 
 124. Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105 (1973). 
 125. Id. at 105, 109 (emphasis added) (discussing the case of a protestor who was convicted of 
disorderly conduct but primarily focusing on the issue of imminence rather than the nature of the lawless 
activity). 
 126. Terminiello, 337 U.S. at 3. 
 127. Hess, 414 U.S. at 105, 109. 
 128. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (emphasis added) (describing the standard 
for speech inducing incitement as “advocacy of the use of force or of law violation . . . directed to 
inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action”); Rohr, 
supra note 70, at 14 (stating that the second element in the Brandenburg test is to determine if the 
advocacy calls for immediate law violation). 
 129. BART Protest Could Impact Evening Commute, supra note 39. 
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threatened to conduct his activity at an ambiguous “later” time,130 No 
Justice No BART’s actions were planned for a specific time.131 When 
BART took action to shut off cell service just before 4:30 p.m., 
BART believed that a protest was imminent, and based on past 
experience with this particular group, they anticipated lawless 
action.132 
However, when BART made the decision to cut the cell service, 
the protestors had not arrived at the stations nor had they begun to 
communicate about the planned protest.133 BART shut off cell 
service preemptively, before protestors even began using their cell 
phones to advocate for potential lawless activity at the station.134 
There was prior speech on No Justice No BART’s website 
advocating for the protest, and the protest may have been imminent; 
135 however, the website was not targeted by BART, but rather, 
BART officials targeted future potentially inciting speech.136 
The last Brandenburg element is whether lawless activity was 
likely to occur.137 The protest organizers had engaged in prior 
protests at BART stations, including one that occurred the previous 
month.138 In that July protest, No Justice No BART participants did 
not engage in violence but were disruptive by screaming, blocking 
train doors, climbing on top of a train, and protesting in restricted 
areas.139 Yet, not all protestors were disruptive; some protestors 
peacefully handed out flyers.140 BART reasonably141 thought the 
                                                                                                                                      
 130. Hess, 414 U.S. at 105, 107–09. 
 131. BART Protest Could Impact Evening Commute, supra note 39. 
 132. Franklin & Wakeman, supra note 12 (stating that BART turned off phone service at 4:00 p.m. 
just prior to the time they believed protestors would arrive at the stations). 
 133. Elias, supra note 9; Franklin & Wakeman, supra note 12; Jonsson, supra note 13. 
 134. Franklin & Wakeman, supra note 12. 
 135. See BART Protest Could Impact Evening Commute, supra note 39. 
 136. For a discussion of how the Prior Restraints doctrine could potentially apply to this BART 
incident, see Spencer, supra note 43, at 780–88. Spencer evaluates several Supreme Court and appellate 
cases and suggests that “[t]he government presumptively violates the First Amendment if it prevents 
free speech activities prior to any illegal action by demonstrators or before a demonstration poses a clear 
and present danger.” Id. at 782. 
 137. See supra note 128. 
 138. See Bender, supra note 22 (discussing the No Justice No BART protests on July 11, 2011). 
 139. Id. 
 140. Id. 
 141. The Supreme Court’s opinion in Gitlow v. New York presents an early formulation of the clear 
and present danger test: 
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upcoming protest would resemble No Justice No BART’s prior 
demonstration. In the prior demonstration, where BART deployed an 
increased security presence, BART did not arrest anyone,142 
suggesting it did not perceive the threat to be serious. BART 
officials, however, commented negatively on the disruption, saying 
that in the future there would be “zero tolerance” for those types of 
disruptive activities.143 
In anticipation of the protest action, BART completely cut cell 
service to its stations, impacting potential protestors as well as all 
other passengers in the affected areas.144 Whether or not the protest 
participants’ future speech was within a protected category, BART 
also eliminated cell service to passengers at the platforms. The 
protestors were only a small portion of all people using BART’s cell 
signal,145 and there is no evidence that the other passengers’ speech 
was within one of the unprotected categories of speech. 
BART eliminated cell service preemptively to remove the threat 
that future speech would aid an imminent and potentially disruptive 
protest.146 If that speech was found to be part of an unprotected class, 
it would not be subject to First Amendment protection147 unless the 
                                                                                                                                      
[T]he immediate danger is none the less real and substantial, because the effect of a given 
utterance cannot be accurately foreseen. . . . [T]he State is [not] acting arbitrarily or 
unreasonably when . . . it seeks to extinguish the spark without waiting until it has 
enkindled the flame or blazed into the conflagration. 
Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 669 (1925). However, Spencer suggests that BART’s actions were 
unreasonable because BART “impermissibly based its decision on the fact that violence had previously 
occurred during a protest of the same nature.” Spencer, supra note 43, at 785. For this proposition, 
Spencer cites Collins v. Jordan. Id. at 783. “As a matter of law . . . the occurrence of limited violence 
and disorder on one day is not a justification for banning all demonstrations, peaceful and otherwise, on 
the immediately following day (or for an indefinite period thereafter).” Id. (quoting Collins v. Jordan, 
110 F.3d 1363, 1372 (9th Cir. 1996)). 
 142. See Bender, supra note 22. 
 143. Ho, supra note 22 (quoting a BART spokesman who said, “That delay goes to the protesters . . . . 
That mess, those fringe groups own it.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 144. See Franklin & Wakeman, supra note 12. 
 145. See generally Cabanatuan, supra note 49 (discussing BART’s wireless coverage). In the July 
2011 protest there were only about 100 protestors compared with the approximately 335,000 patrons 
that used the stations daily in 2010. BART Fiscal Year Weekday Average Exits, BART, 
http://www.bart.gov/docs/FY11_Average_Weekday_Exits.pdf (last visited Feb. 10, 2013); Ho, supra 
note 22. 
 146. See Franklin & Wakeman, supra note 12. 
 147. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942). 
22
Georgia State University Law Review, Vol. 29, Iss. 3 [2013], Art. 6
https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol29/iss3/6
2013] BAY AREA RAPID TRANSIT ACTIONS OF AUGUST 11, 2011 805 
 
court found BART’s actions were content-based.148 However, it 
seems more likely the speech was within a protected class. Therefore, 
the next step would be to subject BART’s actions to forum and 
content discrimination analyses.149 
B. BART’s Cell Phone Service And BART Platforms: A Multiple 
Forum Analysis 
The fact the speech restriction occurred on BART property using 
BART cell signals—both government property—requires a forum 
analysis to determine whether BART is a public forum, designated 
public forum, or non-public forum.150 The BART stations are not 
traditional public forums because the Court has limited those to 
streets and parks—places traditionally open to expression.151 Further, 
like Perry,152 BART did not grant general access to the paid areas of 
its platforms, so those areas would not be designated public 
forums.153 It does not matter that BART allowed protests to occur 
inside the paid areas because a government must intentionally open 
the forum.154 Therefore, because the platforms were non-public 
forums,155 BART’s decision to shut down cell service in the paid 
areas would likely be found constitutional, so long as the decision 
was not content-based.156 
                                                                                                                                      
 148. R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 383–84 (1992) (stating that unprotected speech can be afforded 
First Amendment protections if the censorship is content-based). 
 149. See supra notes 74, 90 and accompanying text. 
 150. See Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 802 (1985). 
 151. Id. at 802. 
 152. Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37 (1983). 
 153. Id. at 45, 47 (stating that there was no evidence the system was open for use by the general 
public—so it was not a public forum); see also Franklin & Wakeman, supra note 12 (describing 
BART’s policy of allowing protest activities only in specified non-paid areas of its stations). The non-
paid areas of the stations, unlike the paid areas, may be considered designated public forums because 
BART had a policy of allowing access to the general public. 
 154. Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 802. Further, BART did not have a policy of allowing protestors to use 
the paid areas of their stations, as did the University in Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 265 (1981). 
 155. All other types of public property, other than those falling within the public and designated 
public forums, are considered non-public forums. See Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., v. 
Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 678–79 (1992). 
 156. Perry, 460 U.S. at 46. The Court has considered safety concerns significant governmental 
interests; therefore, BART’s safety justification would likely meet the lower standard of reasonableness. 
See Heffron v. Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640, 650 (1981). 
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A forum, however, is not limited to tangible property, so 
alternately, BART’s cell signals could be considered the applicable 
forum.157 BART’s provision of cell phone signals could be 
considered a forum because the protestors were seeking to use the 
signals to organize their protest.158 If BART’s cell service was the 
forum, it would likely be a designated public forum159 because 
BART intentionally made its cell service publicly accessible to 
anyone with the equipment to use the service.160 
Assuming, arguendo, that BART’s cell service is a designated 
public forum, then the standard of review would depend on the 
outcome of a content discrimination analysis.161 
C. The Content Discrimination Debate 
The final phase of this constitutional analysis is to determine 
whether the decision to cut cell phone service was content-based or 
content-neutral and apply the appropriate level of scrutiny.162 No 
Justice No BART contends the reason BART cut off cell service was 
to stop a high profile, planned protest about the conduct of BART’s 
own police force, which supports an argument that it was a content-
based restriction.163 BART, on the other hand, contends that, 
although the cell phone shutdown targeted the protestors, BART’s 
                                                                                                                                      
 157. See Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 801 (“[I]n defining the forum we have focused on the access sought 
by the speaker.”). In Cornelius, the forum was determined to be a fundraising campaign, not the 
government building. Id. at 801. In Perry, the forum was defined as a school’s internal mail system and 
not the school building. Perry, 460 U.S. at 47. 
 158. See Franklin & Wakeman, supra note 12 (stating that protestors planned to use cell service 
within the station to coordinate the protest). 
 159. See Perry, 460 U.S. at 45 (describing the designated public forum). 
 160. Cabanatuan, supra note 49 (discussing BART’s wireless coverage); Wireless Connections, supra 
note 11. The cell service would likely not be considered a traditional public forum due to the lack of 
tradition generally associated with new technologies. Some authors have proposed expanding or 
modernizing the traditional public forum to include technological or “virtual” forums. E.g., Fleming, 
supra note 21, at 652–61; Lackert, supra note 21, at 596–98. 
 161. In designated public forums, the standard for content-based exclusions of speech is a compelling 
state interest with action “narrowly drawn to achieve that interest.” Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 800. Content-
neutral actions must be “narrowly tailored to serve a significant government interest, and leave open 
ample alternative channels for communication.” Id. at 800 (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks 
omitted); U.S. Postal Serv. v. Council of Greenburgh Civic Ass’ns, 453 U.S. 114, 132 (1981). 
 162. See Chemerinsky, supra note 71, at 53 (“Today, virtually every free speech case turns on the 
application of the distinction between content-based and content-neutral laws.”). 
 163. See Response to BART’s Illegal Blackout of Phone Service, supra note 44. 
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decision to cut cell service was motivated by a concern for the safety, 
welfare, and convenience of their passengers.164 This supports the 
theory that it was a content-neutral action. 
A government law or action is generally deemed content-based if it 
is restricted because of its subject matter or viewpoint.165 On its face, 
BART’s actions appear to be content-neutral because BART shut off 
cell service to everyone on the platforms.166 Although BART shut off 
cell service to all passengers, they only cut the service for a limited 
time period and at limited locations corresponding to the time and 
places of No Justice No BART’s planned protest.167 This type of 
targeted action is similar to Police Department v. Mosley, where the 
Supreme Court overturned a Chicago ordinance allowing peaceful 
picketing for some groups but not for others.168 In contrast, in Hill v. 
Colorado, the Supreme Court stated that a government action does 
not become an unconstitutional content-based restriction on speech 
simply because it is applied “to the specific locations where [that] 
discourse occurs.”169 However, unlike Hill v. Colorado, BART did 
not restrict cell service only during regular peak rush hours; they 
specifically turned it off on one occasion because they believed No 
Justice No BART would be present.170 
Even if BART’s decision to cut cell service is considered content-
based, the secondary effects doctrine would likely apply.171 Like City 
of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc. and Boos v. Barry,172 BART 
                                                                                                                                      
 164. See Franklin & Wakeman, supra note 12 (citing safety concerns over potential falls from 
overcrowded platforms near an electrified third rail and safety concerns posed by trains stopped in 
tunnels). 
 165. See Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 643 (1994). 
 166. See Franklin & Wakeman, supra note 12. 
 167. See id. BART representatives state their actions were aimed at this particular group’s activities. 
See id. 
 168. See Police Dep’t of Chi. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972). 
 169. See Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 724 (2000) (alteration in original) (discussing that a statute 
making it illegal to approach within eight feet of another health care facility was not a content-based 
law). The Court also gave an example of this principle. Id. “A statute prohibiting solicitation in airports 
that was motivated by the aggressive approaches of Hare Krishnas does not become content based solely 
because its application is confined to airports . . . .” Id. 
 170. See Franklin & Wakeman, supra note 12. 
 171. See City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 47 (1986). 
 172. Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 321 (1988) (suggesting that if the contested content-based 
regulations had been justified by concerns about congestion, interference with ingress or egress, visual 
clutter, or security, the secondary effects doctrine may have applied); Playtime Theatres, 475 U.S. at 47 
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representatives say their shutdown of service was not due to the 
message but the effects of the protest organized by the restricted 
speech.173 BART clearly states that its concern was the safety of its 
passengers and the orderly functioning of its transportation system, 
although some internal e-mail exchanges may belie that 
contention.174 Therefore, it is more likely that the Court would 
consider BART’s action to fall within the secondary effects doctrine, 
meaning it would be scrutinized as if it were a content-neutral 
action.175 
If the cell phone shutdown is deemed content-neutral, BART can 
place reasonable176 time, place, and manner restrictions on the 
speech.177 Like Grayned, BART’s decision to shut down cell service 
                                                                                                                                      
(holding that the location of adult theatres could be restricted because these restrictions targeted the 
secondary effects of the theatre on the community—such as increased crime—and not the actual content 
of the adult films). 
 173. See Franklin & Wakeman, supra note 12. 
 174. See id.; Elinson, supra note 43; Spencer, supra note 43. For a discussion of how BART’s 
internal communications could be the deciding factor in a court finding that BART’s actions were 
content-based, see Spencer, supra note 43, at 778–79. This note gives more weight to BART’s official 
statements because they invoke a safety rationale. “As applied by lower courts in recent years, the 
already watered-down requirements of content neutrality and narrow tailoring have been strained to the 
point of breaking under the weight of the government’s post-Seattle, post-9/11 security interest.” Ronald 
J. Krotoszynski, Jr. & Clint A. Carpenter, The Return of Seditious Libel, 55 UCLA L. REV. 1239, 1267 
(2008). “Temporary regulations enacted in the name of security are the real-world equivalents of get-
out-of-jail-free cards for governments seeking to restrict protest.” Id. at 1259. “Time and again, judges 
have simply credited governments’ arguments that enjoyed social currency as justifications for 
restrictions on speech, rather than pressing the government to prove the truth of those assertions.” Id. at 
1258. 
 175. If, arguendo, BART’s action was considered content-based, the Court would review it using 
strict scrutiny: the government action must be narrowly tailored to meet a compelling state interest. See 
Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2738 (2011). BART stated that its actions were based 
on ensuring the safety of its passengers, and the Court has viewed a threat to public safety as a 
compelling interest. See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 377 (1992); Franklin & Wakeman, 
supra note 12 (discussing the hazards at the stations). The cell phone shutdown must also be narrowly 
tailored to meet that compelling safety interest. See Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781 (1989). 
It is unclear if BART’s actions were sufficiently tailored to meet this compelling interest. See infra notes 
186–91 and accompanying text. 
 176. See Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 116–17 (1972) (stating the reasonableness of the 
restrictions is based on “[t]he nature of a place, [and] the pattern of its normal activities,” and the 
essential inquiry is “whether the manner of expression is basically incompatible with the normal activity 
of a particular place at a particular time”). 
 177. See Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 530, 536 (1980) (“Therefore, a 
constitutionally permissible time, place, or manner restriction may not be based upon either the content 
or subject matter of speech.”); Linmark Assocs. v. Twp. of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85, 93 (1977) 
(“[L]aws regulating the time, place, or manner of speech stand on a different footing from laws 
prohibiting speech altogether.”); Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 
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advances its interests in having safe and orderly transit stations.178 
Also, like Cox v. Louisiana, BART’s actions to shut down cell 
service stopped a protest that might have caused serious system-wide 
disruption to transit schedules.179 In addition, the shutdown only 
lasted four hours and was restricted to the platform areas of the 
concourse where safety issues are highest.180 BART’s restrictions, 
therefore, appear reasonable. 
BART’s time, place, and manner restrictions must also be 
narrowly tailored181 to serve a substantial governmental interest,182 
and leave open ample channels for communication of information.183 
The Court has frequently said that public safety, order, and 
convenience are substantial governmental interests.184 BART 
                                                                                                                                      
U.S. 748, 771 (1976) (“We have often approved [time, place, and manner] restrictions . . . provided that 
they are justified without reference to the content of the regulated speech, that they serve a significant 
governmental interest, and that in so doing they leave open ample alternative channels for 
communication of the information.”). But see Fleming, supra note 21, at 648 (citing Madsen v. 
Women’s Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 765 (1994) for the proposition that “when the regulation is 
only temporary in nature, designed specifically to address an immediate issue and not to set a standard 
that will apply to all speakers in the future, as in the BART situation, the intermediate scrutiny of the 
reasonable time, place, and manner test should not be applicable and a more searching level should be 
applied”). However, the Court in Madsen v. Women’s Health Center, Inc. was discussing the differences 
in standards relating to a statutory prohibition versus an injunction, and therefore, it is not directly on 
point with the BART cell service shutdown. See Madsen v. Women’s Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 
763–65 (1994). 
 178. Grayned, 408 U.S. at 119 (upholding a noise ordinance because it advanced the city’s “interest 
in having an undisrupted school session conducive to the students’ learning”). 
 179. Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 554 (1965); see also Grayned, 408 U.S. at 115–16 (“A 
demonstration or parade on a large street during rush hour might put an intolerable burden on the 
essential flow of traffic . . . .”). 
 180. See Franklin & Wakeman, supra note 12. 
 181. Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 726 (2000) (“[W]hen a content-neutral regulation does not 
entirely foreclose any means of communication, it may satisfy the tailoring requirement even though it 
is not the least restrictive or least intrusive means of serving the statutory goal.”). But see Ward v. Rock 
Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 800 (“‘A complete ban can be narrowly tailored but only if each activity 
within the proscription’s scope is an appropriately targeted evil.’” (quoting Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 
474, 485 (1988))). 
 182. Heffron v. Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640, 650 (1981) (“As a general 
matter, it is clear that a State’s interest in protecting the ‘safety and convenience’ of persons using a 
public forum is a valid governmental objective.”). In Heffron, the Court found that the significance of 
the governmental interest should be assessed by considering the nature and function of the particular 
forum. Id. at 651. Since the small fairgrounds drew large crowds, “the State’s interest in the orderly 
movement and control of such an assembly is a substantial consideration.” Id. at 641. 
 183. See supra note 88. 
 184. See Heffron, 452 U.S. at 650; Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 88–89 (1949) (stating the 
government has a legitimate interest in the “comfort and convenience” of its citizens); Cox v. New 
Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 576 (1941) (holding that time, place, and manner restrictions placed on a 
27
Pitzel: Bay Area Rapid Transit Actions of August 11, 2011: How Emerging D
Published by Reading Room, 2013
810 GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 29:3 
likewise justifies its actions by citing concerns for safety and 
order.185 
Narrow tailoring would present a larger issue for BART. BART’s 
actions impacted more than just the protestors.186 Ward v. Rock 
Against Racism suggests that BART’s sweeping actions of cutting 
cell service to everyone on the platforms would not be properly 
tailored because the shutdown affected regular speech that was not 
“an appropriately targeted evil.”187 Furthermore, because this was a 
complete shutdown of service on the platform levels,188 it should be 
the least restrictive means of achieving BART’s goals of safety, 
order, and convenience.189 In Schneider v. New Jersey, the Court said 
the least restrictive means to prevent littering from flyer distribution 
was not to ban the flyers but to punish those who threw the litter in 
the street.190 BART could deploy additional police officers, as they 
did during the prior demonstration, and punish those who become 
disruptive, which they did not do during the prior protest.191 
However, an alternative interpretation would be that because BART 
was concerned about the safety effects the future speech would 
cause, BART’s actions were narrowly tailored since it only targeted 
speech. 
Most importantly, BART must have left open ample channels for 
communication of information.192 BART shut down its cell signal, 
                                                                                                                                      
parade license were constitutional because they were based on the city’s legitimate interests in 
regulating traffic and securing public order). 
 185. See Franklin & Wakeman, supra note 12. 
 186. See supra note 145 and accompanying text. 
 187. Ward, 491 U.S. at 800 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). Service to 
customers, who were not protestors, was also disrupted; regular speech impacted by this broad action 
could have included health care practitioners checking on patients, employees engaging in work-related 
activities, or just friends and family staying in touch with each other. See Fleming, supra note 21, at 
645. 
 188. It could also be argued that this was not a complete shutdown because cell service was still 
available on the street level. Franklin & Wakeman, supra note 12. In Heffron, the Court said that the 
decision to set aside a certain area of the fair for distribution of information was not a total ban because 
the distributors were “not secreted away in some nonaccessible location, but [were] located within the 
area of the fairgrounds where visitors are expected, and indeed encouraged, to pass.” Heffron, 452 U.S. 
at 655 n.16. This regulation fixed the location but was not a total ban. Id. 
 189. See Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 726 (2000). 
 190. See Schneider v. New Jersey, 308 U.S. 147, 162–63 (1939). 
 191. See Bender, supra note 22. 
 192. See City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43, 45–46, 58, 56 (1994); Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-
28
Georgia State University Law Review, Vol. 29, Iss. 3 [2013], Art. 6
https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol29/iss3/6
2013] BAY AREA RAPID TRANSIT ACTIONS OF AUGUST 11, 2011 811 
 
but cell service was not completely unavailable at the stations. Cell 
service was available at street level.193 BART also made intercom 
service and courtesy phones available to passengers.194 Ultimately, 
however, the available means of communication either did not 
connect to the internet or did not allow the user to communicate with 
multiple persons at once while actively commuting and, therefore, do 
not seem to be effective substitutes for the type of service BART 
eliminated. 
It is questionable, however, whether courts consider cell service to 
be an irreplaceable means of communication. In Gilleo, the city 
banned most yard signs arguing that there were other forms of 
communication homeowners could use to express themselves, but the 
Court disagreed because yard signs were a distinct, “venerable,” and 
“long . . . important” form of expression without adequate 
substitutes.195 The Court’s description of what constitutes an 
irreplaceable method of communication is a crucial point. Cell 
service is an increasingly important medium of communication,196 
but whether a court would consider cell phone communication—
digital speech—to be a distinct, “venerable,” and “long . . . 
important” form of expression is unclear.197 
A final public policy consideration is whether viewing BART’s 
actions as unconstitutional would have a chilling effect on 
government entities providing public access to cell service. If a 
government feared legal action from shutting down its cell signal, it 
might not be inclined to make similar future resource allocations. 
A court would likely find BART’s actions constitutional if the 
potential cell communications were considered incitement or if the 
                                                                                                                                      
Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984). The California Supreme Court observed: 
[T]he disconnection of telephones not only may deprive the subscriber of the monetary 
value of his economic venture, but in such circumstances denies him an essential means 
of communication for which there is no effective substitute. Hence, this restraint upon 
communication by the subscriber also affects his right of free speech as guaranteed by the 
First Amendment of the federal Constitution. 
Sokol v. Pub. Util. Comm’n, 418 P.2d 265, 270 (Cal. 1966). 
 193. Franklin & Wakeman, supra note 12. 
 194. Id. 
 195. Gilleo, 512 U.S. at 45–46, 58, 56 (citing other means, such as bumper stickers and flyers). 
 196. See supra notes 14, 16 and accompanying text. 
 197. See discussion infra Part III.A. 
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forum was the BART station itself rather than the cell signal because 
there would be either no protection for the speech or a lower standard 
of review for BART to meet.198 If the forum was the cell signal itself, 
then BART’s actions would be subject to increased levels of 
scrutiny.199 The crux is whether the complete shutdown of cell 
service was sufficiently tailored to meet BART’s interests in safety 
and order and whether BART left open ample alternative channels of 
communication.200 
III. THE NEED TO FIND ALTERNATE SOURCES OF PROTECTION FOR 
DIGITAL SPEECH 
The August 11, 2011 BART incident201 was not the only attempt 
by a government entity in the United States to restrict digital speech. 
Although ultimately vetoed by the mayor, the Cleveland city council 
passed an ordinance making the use of social media in certain 
circumstances a misdemeanor.202 The United States Congress also 
proposed legislation in 2010 that would have allowed the government 
to manage cybertechnology, including telecommunications, in the 
event of a national security threat.203 In 2012, the Georgia General 
Assembly introduced a resolution that urged the United States 
                                                                                                                                      
 198. See supra notes 146–48, 151–56 and accompanying text. 
 199. See supra text accompanying notes 157–61. 
 200. See supra text accompanying notes 184–85, 192–97. 
 201. See discussion supra Part I.B. 
 202. See Ordinance No. 1012-11, ACLU OHIO (July 21, 2011), http://www.acluohio.org/assets/issues 
/FreeSpeech/CityOfClevelandSocialMediaOrdinance2011_0725.pdf (stating that passage of the 
proposed ordinance would add a new section to the Codified Ordinances of the City of Cleveland, which 
would say, “(a) No person shall use social media to induce persons to commit . . . Disorderly Conduct; 
Intoxication, and/or . . . Unlawful Congregation; (b) Whoever violates this section is guilty of improper 
use of social media, a minor misdemeanor . . . .”); Thomas Ott, Cleveland City Council Upholds Mayor 
Frank Jackson’s Veto on Flash Mobs, PLAIN DEALER (Aug. 18, 2011, 7:28 AM), 
http://blog.cleveland.com/metro/2011/08/cleveland_council_upholds_jack.html (discussing the 
Cleveland city council’s decision not to override the mayor’s veto of the social media legislation). 
 203. See generally S. 3480, 111th Cong. (2010); Denis Binder, Steven Burns & Jeffrey H. Wood, 
Homeland Security: 2010 Annual Report, 2010 A.B.A. ENV’T, ENERGY & RESOURCES L.: YEAR IN REV. 
361 (discussing the Protecting Cyberspace as a National Asset Act of 2010 (S. 3480), which would 
“create a White House Office of Cyberspace Policy to lead federal and private sector efforts to secure 
critical cyber networks and assets.”). This legislation is sometimes referred to as the internet “kill 
switch” legislation. See Bob Barr, Big Brother’s Cell Phone “Kill Switch,” ATLANTA J. CONST. (Aug. 
22, 2011), http://blogs.ajc.com/bob-barr-blog/?s=BART&x=0&y=0. 
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Congress to “amend the Communications Act of 1934 and FCC rules 
so as to permit the use of ‘cellular jammers’ to prevent illegal cell 
phone use in prison facilities; and for other purposes.”204 With 
increasing use of digital methods of speech, accompanied by 
increasing attempts to regulate it,205 more conflict between 
governmental actions and the First Amendment is likely. There are 
four sources of law that can address these potential conflicts. These 
include constitutional protections as interpreted by the Supreme 
Court, individual state constitutional protections, the 
Communications Act of 1934, and other government legislation. 
However, because the Supreme Court has not directly addressed this 
issue and state supreme court decisions can vary across the country, 
relying on courts to interpret First Amendment rights in ways that 
protect this new digital speech206 would be reactive and 
unpredictable. Instead, this Note suggests creating new laws or 
policies that proactively set rules to guide governments’ decision-
making processes. 
A. The Supreme Court’s View Of Digital Speech And New 
Technologies 
As seen in the analysis of the BART incident, a government’s 
traditional safety interests and the need to leave open alternative 
means of communication are important elements207 of a free speech 
                                                                                                                                      
 204. H.R. 1325, 151st Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2012). The resolution passed the Georgia House 
of Representatives on February 16, 2012. Georgia House of Representatives Voting Record, H.R. 1325 
(Feb. 16, 2012). 
 205. Restricting digital speech can be a very attractive and efficient means for the government to 
provide a quick resolution to a perceived issue because these new technologies are able to reach a large 
number of people and because they can be controlled, seemingly, by the flip of a switch. See supra note 
16. BART’s decision to shut off cell phone service was done by turning power off to the cell nodes. See 
supra note 47. This was an effective tool since the protest never materialized. See Elias, supra note 9; 
Jonsson, supra note 13. 
 206. To protect emerging digital technologies, some scholars have proposed that the Supreme Court 
adopt a virtual or modern forum as part of its First Amendment jurisprudence. See Fleming, supra note 
21; Lackert, supra note 21. 
 207. The First Amendment issues would be reduced to whether the action or regulation by the 
government was narrowly tailored to meet the government’s traditional and legitimate interests in safety 
or security while leaving open ample alternative channels for communication. See Turner Broad. Sys., 
Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 642 (1994); see also supra text accompanying notes 181–95. 
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analysis. In future conflicts, how individual fact situations affect 
these elements will be a large component of the outcomes, but the 
crucial, yet undetermined, issue in any future case would ultimately 
turn on the Court’s view of technology.208 
Prior Court statements about how to apply the First Amendment to 
new technologies are conflicting.209 Justice Scalia articulated a 
traditional approach in Brown v. Entertainment Merchants 
Association: “[W]hatever the challenges of applying the Constitution 
to ever-advancing technology, ‘the basic principles of freedom of 
speech and the press, like the First Amendment’s command, do not 
vary’ when a new and different medium for communication 
appears.”210 One First Amendment principle is that when the 
government restricts an entire medium of speech, it must “leave open 
ample alternative channels for communication.”211 The Court has 
stated that there are no adequate substitutes when the restricted 
speech is a “venerable,” “long . . . important,” and “distinct” method 
of communication.212 Given the recent appearance of digital 
communications,213 it is unclear whether this form of communication 
qualifies. Therefore, if the Court applies First Amendment principles 
that favor more traditional forms of communications, obtaining free 
speech protection for new technologies may be difficult. 
                                                                                                                                      
 208. The crucial concern is the existence of adequate alternatives, which depend on the Court’s view 
of cell technology. See supra text accompanying notes 192–97. 
 209. Compare Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Assoc., 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2733 (2011) (quoting Joseph 
Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 503 (1952)), with Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 
U.S. 490, 500–01 (1981). Yet, some scholars have suggested that the Supreme Court has already 
“recognized the inimitable nature of [internet speech].” Wiebe, supra note 21, at 217. The Court has also 
begun to address new technology in relation to the Fourth Amendment. See Fleming, supra note 21, at 
654–57. In his concurring opinion in United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 957 (2012) (Alito, J., 
concurring), Justice Alito “criticized the majority for applying antiquated law to twenty-first century 
surveillance techniques.” Fleming, supra note 21, at 656. Justice Alito also stated that legislatures are 
better equipped than courts to “gauge changing public attitudes, to draw detailed lines, and to balance 
privacy and public safety in a comprehensive way.” United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 964 (2012); 
see also Fleming, supra note 21, at 656. 
 210. Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 2733 (quoting Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 503 (1952)). 
 211. See City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43, 45–46, 58, 56 (1994); Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-
Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984). 
 212. See Gilleo, 512 U.S. at 54–55 (stating there were no adequate alternatives to yard signs). 
 213. See generally The Changes to Mobile Phones over the Last 30 Years, THE PEOPLE HISTORY, 
http://www.thepeoplehistory.com/mobilephones.html (last visited Feb. 10, 2013) (discussing the history 
of cell phones and their increased growth over the past three decades). 
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In contrast to Justice Scalia’s traditional approach to new 
technologies articulated in Brown v. Entertainment Merchants 
Association,214 the Court in Metromedia stated, “This Court has often 
faced the problem of applying the broad principles of the First 
Amendment to unique forums of expression. . . . Each method of 
communicating ideas is ‘a law unto itself’ and that law must reflect 
the ‘differing natures, values, abuses and dangers’ of each 
method.”215 The Metromedia approach to technology is more modern 
and would be more likely to take into consideration qualities of 
digital speech beyond whether it was “venerable” or traditional.216 
The nature of digital speech allows for a variety of communications 
to take place all in one smartphone.217 In the past, this range of 
communications could only be provided by several separate speech 
methods.218 Posting opinions and commentary to a social media site, 
distributing communication and meeting information between like-
minded individuals via electronic mail, Twitter, Facebook, instant 
messaging, and website updating can replicate the function of yard 
signs, billboards, public speeches, printed newsletters, and other 
means of expressing thoughts to others. The widespread adoption, 
speed of message delivery, and variety of applications makes this 
method of communication, while novel, irreplaceable.219 
However, until the Court decides digital speech has attained 
“venerable” status, other forms of protection may be necessary.220 
                                                                                                                                      
 214. Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 2733. 
 215. Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 500–01 (1981) (footnote omitted) 
(citations omitted). 
 216. See Gilleo, 512 U.S. at 54–55. 
 217. See supra notes 1, 16. 
 218. See supra notes 1, 15–16 and accompanying text. 
 219. See supra notes 14–16 and accompanying text. 
 220. Some scholars have suggested that new technologies should be integrated into First Amendment 
jurisprudence by amending the public forum analysis to include a “virtual” or “modern” public forum 
that would be subject to the heightened scrutiny of the traditional public forum. Marvin Ammori, The 
Year in “First Amendment Architecture,” 2012 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 6, 19–20 (2012); Fleming, supra 
note 21, at 652–61; Lackert, supra note 21, at 596–98. Due to the uncertainty in how the Supreme Court 
may approach digital speech, this Note proposes other methods of protecting digital speech. 
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B. State Constitutional Protections 
If the Court does not account for digital speech’s unique attributes, 
then protection for digital speech must come from sources other than 
the First Amendment of the United States Constitution. State 
constitutions are a potential source of protection. State constitutions 
can be more protective of rights but cannot be less protective than the 
United States Constitution.221 
California’s constitution has its own free speech clause,222 which 
California courts have interpreted in ways that differ from the 
Supreme Court’s interpretation of the First Amendment.223 For 
example, in Sokol v. Public Utilities Commission,224 the state 
supreme court said that telephones were “essential” means of 
communication without “effective substitute.”225 If telephone service 
is viewed in this manner, then digital telephone technologies, which 
appear similar, should receive stronger protections under the state 
free speech guarantee. In addition, California has interpreted forum 
requirements differently, finding train stations to be traditional public 
forums.226 Accordingly, speech in the BART incident would receive 
greater protection regardless of whether the forum was determined to 
be the cell service or the station—a consideration in the BART 
incident.227 Finally, a California court has said that a telephone 
company cannot turn off service because it thinks that customers may 
be using the service to transmit information allowing someone to 
                                                                                                                                      
 221. PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 81(1980) (finding a state has the authority to 
“exercise its police power or its sovereign right to adopt in its own Constitution individual liberties more 
expansive than those conferred by the Federal Constitution”). 
 222. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 2 (West, Westlaw through 2012 Reg. Sess.) (“Every person may freely 
speak, write and publish his or her sentiments on all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of this 
right. A law may not restrain or abridge liberty of speech or press.”). 
 223. Kuba v. 1-A Agric. Ass’n, 387 F.3d 850, 856 (9th Cir. 2004) (“The California Constitution 
provides protections for speakers in some respects broader than provided by the First Amendment of the 
Federal Constitution.”); see also letter from Michael T. Risher, ACLU Staff Attorney, to S.F. Bay Area 
Rapid Transit Bd. Of Dirs. (Aug. 22, 2011), available at http://www.aclunc.org/aclu_letter_to_bart_ 
board_of_directors_aug_22_2011.pdf. 
 224. Sokol v. Pub. Util. Comm’n, 418 P.2d 265 (Cal. 1966). 
 225. Id. at 270. 
 226. E.g., In re Hoffman, 434 P.2d 353 (Cal. 1967) (finding that train stations are traditional public 
forums). See generally letter from Michael T. Risher, supra note 223 (discussing Hoffman and other 
examples). 
 227. See discussion supra Part II.B. 
34
Georgia State University Law Review, Vol. 29, Iss. 3 [2013], Art. 6
https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol29/iss3/6
2013] BAY AREA RAPID TRANSIT ACTIONS OF AUGUST 11, 2011 817 
 
violate the law.228 Because California courts have addressed free 
speech elements differently than the Supreme Court, California has 
provided stronger protections for digital speech. In particular, by 
deciding that there are no effective alternatives to telephones, which 
are closely related to mobile phones, California’s courts have filled a 
void in this area of Supreme Court jurisprudence.229 
C. The Communications Act Of 1934 
If a state did not provide increased free speech protection, federal 
laws could potentially afford some legal protection against a 
government action restricting digital speech. The FCC prohibits 
jamming of cell technologies under the Communications Act of 
1934,230 but the statute was inapplicable because BART did not jam 
cell signals but, rather, turned power off to its cell nodes.231 BART or 
any other cellular provider may also be subject to 47 U.S.C. § 214(a), 
which mandates that an entity “impair[ing]” cell service to a 
community must first obtain an FCC certification stating the action 
will not inconvenience the public.232 The statute makes an exception 
for emergencies, but a party must still make a request prior to the 
action.233 Because this law takes the public inconvenience of a cell 
phone shutdown into consideration, it could protect the public’s 
                                                                                                                                      
 228. See letter from Michael T. Risher, supra note 223. The California District Court of Appeals 
stated: 
The telephone company has no more right to refuse its facilities to persons because of a 
belief that such persons will use such service to transmit information that may enable 
recipients thereof to violate the law than a railroad company would have to refuse to 
carry persons on its trains because those in charge of the train believed that the purpose of 
the persons so transported in going to a certain point was to commit an offense. 
People v. Brophy, 120 P.2d 946, 956 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1942). 
 229. See supra text accompanying notes 195–97. 
 230. 47 U.S.C. § 333 (2006). 
 231. See supra note 47. 
 232. 47 U.S.C. § 214(a) (2006). 
 233. Id. (making an exception when an entity requests and the FCC “authorize[s] [a] temporary or 
emergency discontinuance, reduction, or impairment of service, or partial discontinuance, reduction, or 
impairment of service, without regard to the provisions of this section”). The FCC investigated the 
BART incident. Daniel B. Wood, BART Puts Social Media Crackdown in ‘Uncharted’ Legal Territory, 
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Aug. 16, 2011, available at 2011 WLNR 16237522 (discussing the statement 
issued by the FCC that said it was investigating “the important issues . . . including public safety and 
ensuring the availability of communications networks.”). 
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speech rights if a government contemplates restricting cell service 
because of the actions of a small group of users. However, the 
problem with this law lies in its emergency exception. This exception 
gives the FCC great discretion to balance public inconvenience 
against an emergency. Because a government’s safety interests have 
long been considered significant,234 this balance would likely tip 
toward the government’s action, and the regulation would not 
provide protection for the technology user. 
D. Other Legislation Or Policies 
Potential digital speech safeguards include the reactionary 
protections provided by the Supreme Court and state constitutions 
and the current weak FCC statutes. Therefore, Congress or state 
governments should enact legislation or policies that protect digital 
speech before it is violated—proactive protection.235 New legislation 
or policies should address the seemingly unlimited discretion that 
government officials now have by invoking security concerns to 
address perceived threats from digital technologies and should 
impose procedures for determining when shutdowns are appropriate. 
Admittedly, given the security threats that exist in the post-9/11 
world, this would be a difficult line to draw, but there is an 
appreciable difference between security threats that entail a seven-
minute average train delay236 and ones that involve terrorists using 
cell signals to detonate a bomb.237 There are precedents for imposing 
                                                                                                                                      
 234. See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 377 (1992); Krotoszynski & Carpenter, supra note 
174. 
 235. In early 2012, “a California state senator introduced a bill that would require a magistrate order 
to effectuate a wireless service interruption, and a Chicago alderman proposed an ordinance that would 
restrict the ability of law enforcement officer to interrupt wireless service.” FED. COMMC’N COMM’N, 
COMMISSION SEEKS COMMENT ON CERTAIN WIRELESS SERVICE INTERRUPTIONS 2 n.6 (2012), available 
at http://www.fcc.gov/document/commission-seeks-comment-certain-wireless-service-interruptions; 
Don Babwin, Chicago Asked Not to Stifle Wireless at Summits, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Feb. 15, 
2012, 4:20 PM), available at http://www.businessweek.com/ap/financialnews/D9SU230O0.htm. 
 236. See supra text accompanying note 34. 
 237. See Christina Mendez, ‘Cell Phone Set Off Bomb,’ PHILSTAR.COM, (Jan. 27, 2011, 12:00 AM), 
http://www.philstar.com/headlines/651437/cell-phone-set-bomb (describing an incident where a bomb 
was triggered by a cell phone). On March 1, 2012, the FCC issued a public notice stating that the FCC 
was “seek[ing] comment on concerns and issues related to intentional interruptions of [wireless service] 
by government authorities for the purpose of ensuring public safety.” FED. COMMC’N COMM’N, supra 
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such procedures. Section 706 of the Communications Act of 1934 
gives the President of the United States authority to shut down 
wireless communications during war or the threat of war.238 This Act 
would not have been applicable in the BART incident, but it is an 
example of giving the government the ability to take action in a 
defined circumstance.239 In addition, in December 2011, BART 
adopted a new “cell service interruption policy.”240 This policy 
outlines the necessary steps to be taken before an interruption can be 
enacted and states that cell phone service can only be interrupted 
under “extraordinary circumstances.”241 Significantly, the policy 
provides examples of extraordinary circumstances: (1) evidence of 
use of cell phones “as instrumentalities in explosives;” (2) “to 
facilitate violent criminal activity;” or (3) “to facilitate specific plans 
or attempts to destroy District property or substantially disrupt public 
transit services.”242 The federal government, states, municipalities, or 
other public entities should consider passing similar legislation or 
policies that detail when and how the decision to discontinue cell 
service should be made. This would provide a procedural hurdle to 
                                                                                                                                      
note 235, at 1. The public notice stated that the FCC was “focused on situations where one or more 
wireless carriers, or their authorized agents, interrupt their own services in an area for a limited time 
period at the request of a government actor, or have their services interrupted by a government actor that 
exercises lawful control over network faculties.” Id. at 2. The FCC further stated that “[a]ny intentional 
interruption of wireless service, no matter how brief or localized, raises significant concerns and 
implicates substantial legal and policy questions.” Id. 
 238. 47 U.S.C. § 606(d) (2006) (stating that the president has the authority to “cause the closing of 
any facility or station for wire communication and the removal therefrom of its apparatus and 
equipment”). 
 239. The Protecting Cyberspace as a National Asset Act of 2010 is an example of a bill that does not 
adequately limit discretion. See, e.g., S. 3480, 111th Cong. (2010). It allows the federal government to 
impact cellular service except when there is an undefined “threat.” Id. 
 240. Extraordinary Circumstances Only for Cell Phone Interruptions, BART (Dec. 1, 2011), 
http://www.bart.gov/news/articles/2011/news20111201.aspx; Michael Cabanatuan, BART Cell Phone 
Shutdown Rules Adopted, S.F. CHRON. (Dec. 2, 2011, 4:00 AM), http://www.sfgate.com/bayarea/article/ 
BART-cell-phone-shutdown-rules-adopted-2344326.php. Reportedly, the FCC reviewed BART’s draft 
policy and made suggestions for the final policy document. See id. The FCC made the following public 
comment regarding BART’s cell service interruption policy: “Today BART took an important step in 
responding to legitimate concerns raised by its August 11, 2011 interruption of wireless service. As the 
policy BART adopted recognizes, communication networks that are open and available are critical to 
our democracy and economy.” FCC Chairman Julius Genachowski’s Statement on BART Policy 
Adoption, FCC (Dec. 1, 2012), http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-311310A1.pdf. 
 241. Cell Service Interruption Policy, BART, http://www.bart.gov/docs/final_CSIP.pdf (last visited 
Sept. 20, 2012). 
 242. Id. 
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and some accountability on a government official’s ability to disrupt 
an important First Amendment right. 
Creating legislation or new policies that consider the unique and 
important features of digital speech could provide protection for 
digital speech that is currently lacking under the somewhat muddled 
state of First Amendment law. 
CONCLUSION 
BART’s shut down of cell service on August 11, 2011 was a novel 
exercise of government power over free speech.243 BART, as owner 
of the cell service, shut down speech in anticipation of certain actions 
that the future speech might provoke.244 Although BART had 
legitimate safety interests in protecting its passengers, shutting down 
an entire, unique means of communication impacted more people 
than just the protestors.245 This incident highlights the inadequacies 
of the Supreme Court’s freedom of speech jurisprudence when 
applied to a situation involving digital technologies.246 If the Court 
applied its traditional free speech principles247 to the BART incident, 
whether No Justice No BART’s speech constituted unprotected 
incitement and whether the forum was the BART station or the cell 
service are unclear.248 Assuming the actions were not incitement and 
the forum was the cell service, BART’s actions could be considered 
content-neutral and receive a level of scrutiny that pits BART’s 
significant safety interests against the availability of alternate means 
of communication.249 How the Court views digital speech is an 
important, but unknown, factor in the ultimate outcome.250 
Today, people use smartphones as a kind of mobile printing press. 
They allow an increasing number of users to communicate widely 
                                                                                                                                      
 243. See supra note 13 and accompanying text. 
 244. See discussion supra Part I.B. 
 245. See supra note 145 and accompanying text. 
 246. See discussion supra Part III.A. 
 247. See supra note 107 and accompanying text. 
 248. See discussion supra Part II.A–B. 
 249. See discussion supra Part II.C. 
 250. See discussion supra Part III.A. 
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and instantaneously.251 This widespread and rapid dissemination of 
ideas provides a means for people to peacefully express their views 
or to organize rallies, but it also provides means for others to threaten 
security on a much wider scale. Therefore, there needs to be a careful 
balancing of free speech rights against public safety concerns—one 
that involves accounting for the uniqueness and importance of this 
method of communication. Because the Court may employ a 
traditional application of First Amendment tests, digital speech may 
not be adequately protected. Until digital speech attains “venerable” 
status, it is necessary to enact proactive protections at the federal or 
state level. The use of social media and emerging technologies 
continue to increase; therefore, the law needs to address the 
complicated issues arising from these new means of digital speech. 
  
                                                                                                                                      
 251. See supra note 16 and accompanying text. 
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